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ABSTRACT 
 
 
TWO ESSAYS ON MUTUAL FUNDS 
 
BY 
 
ANNA AGAPOVA 
 
April 16, 2007 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Jason T. Greene 
 
Major Department: Finance 
 
 
 The first essay examines cross-sectional differences between money market 
mutual funds (MMMFs), in the context of the sponsoring fund family. While extant 
studies have shown that fund family characteristics impact the management of open-end 
equity mutual funds, results of this study’s analysis find that fund family characteristics 
also affect the management of MMMF assets, contributing to differences in the maturity 
of the fund’s holdings, expenses, and realized returns. I find that an MMMF is not simply 
a transitional account with a short-term low-risk investment objective, but rather, a 
critical role player within the fund family. Differences in maturity, yield, and expenses in 
MMMFs can be explained by family-specific characteristics, including diversification 
and cash management strategies at the family level.  
The second essay examines implications of substitutability of two similar 
financial assets: conventional index mutual funds and exchange traded funds (ETFs). I 
seek to explain the coexistence of these fund types, since both offer a claim on the same 
underlying index return process, but have different organizational structures. This study 
compares conventional open-end index funds with matched ETFs on various underlying 
indexes. Aggregate flows are used to detect substitution and clientele effects. I show that 
conventional funds and ETFs are substitutes, while ETFs have smaller tracking errors and 
lower fund expenses. However, I find that these fund types are not perfect substitutes, 
and their coexistence can be explained by a clientele effect that segregates them into 
different market niches. 
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ESSAY ONE 
CROSS-SECTIONAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MONEY MARKET MUTUAL 
FUNDS AND THEIR ROLE IN MUTUAL FUND FAMILIES 
 
1. Introduction  
Money market mutual funds (MMMFs) have existed for more than three decades, 
with the first such funds being introduced in 1972. By 1984, 305 MMMFs existed, 
totaling nearly $270 billion in assets. Over the last two decades, MMMFs have grown to 
include more than $2 trillion in assets across 993 funds, and comprise approximately 25% 
of U.S. open-end mutual fund assets by 2005, according to the Investment Company 
Institute (ICI).  
Though MMMFs are second only to equity funds in terms of dollar value of assets 
in the mutual fund industry, the majority of existing literature concentrates on equity 
funds. Many studies of open-end equity funds examine how these funds differ in the 
cross-section, and how these funds are affected by the characteristics of the sponsoring 
family. In contrast, there are currently only a few studies that address the cross-sectional 
differences among money market funds, and no studies relating MMMF fund family 
characteristics.  
However, numerous researches focus on the skill of equity fund managers.1 
Although there is extensive literature on the cross-sectional differences in performance 
and fund characteristics among equity mutual funds that examines management 
effectiveness in efficient markets, there are virtually no studies that address these issues 
with regard to mutual funds that invest in fixed income securities, specifically, MMMFs. 
As exemplified in Table 1, there are substantial differences in weighted average maturity, 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Elton et al (1993), Carhart (1997), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), among others. 
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yields and expenses across MMMFs; however, relatively little research has been done to 
explain these cross-sectional differences. This study extends the coverage of issues 
related to MMMFs. 
In this study, I apply fund family characteristics similar to those that have been 
used to explain differences among equity funds, to explain cross-sectional differences 
between MMMFs. I propose that money market mutual funds are not just transitional 
accounts with short-term low-risk investment objectives, but might play an important role 
within the fund family. As the mutual fund family has its own objective function to 
maximize, it may use MMMFs to improve performance of the family in total. 
Specifically, I examine the extent to which MMMFs are used within fund families for the 
purposes of cash and risk management. I also examine the impact of clientele effects on 
the characteristics of MMMFs.   
To study the performance-flow relation of MMMFs and how it affects decisions 
to waive fees, Christoffersen (2001) employs Sirri and Tufano’s (1998) methodology of 
estimating a piecewise-linear fund flow function and finds that better performers attract 
more flows, though poor performers do not experience outflows. Further, Christoffersen 
examines the decision to waive fees and finds that variation in fee waivers is significant 
and relates to the relative performance of the MMMF.  
In this study, I examine whether MMMFs play the role of a family’s internal cash 
center in which other funds in a family may perform their liquidity transactions using 
MMMFs. By using such cash management strategies, fund families can save on 
transaction costs at the family level by avoiding transactions with external entities when 
possible. Investors can also use MMMFs similarly, as they have an option of free asset 
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transfers within the family, without paying load fees. Thus, if family funds have high 
loads, then investors will likely prefer to stay in the family and use its MMMFs to 
temporarily “park” their cash before investing it elsewhere, versus using sources outside 
the family to meet that need. In this study, I search for evidence of such investor and fund 
family behavior and examine its extent, based on fund family characteristics. 
I also study the degree to which a family’s risk may be internally managed using 
MMMFs, by adjusting the maturities and risk of the funds’ underlying securities, and 
thereby adjusting the risk of MMMFs. I expect that if fund families pursue such risk 
control strategies, then more concentrated families with less diversified portfolios and 
riskier funds with regard to other investment objectives will have less risky MMMFs, 
holding shorter maturity securities. This study explores the evidence of fund family risk 
control in conjunction with its MMMFs, and suggests further explanations for fund 
behavior based on family characteristics.  
Certain cross sectional differences between MMMFs within a family can also 
result from a clientele effect, e.g. a family with a larger variety of funds and investment 
objectives will more likely offer MMMFs with various characteristics to capture the 
heterogeneity of the family’s investors. Massa (2003) finds evidence of family-driven 
heterogeneity among funds, and shows that families actively exploit it.  
Results demonstrate that MMMF returns are influenced by risk and maturity of 
the MMMFs’ portfolios, fund expenses, size, and macroeconomic factors. I find evidence 
that fund families and their investors use MMMFs as a cash center, and that fund families 
use MMMFs to internally manage risk at the family level. The observed diversity in the 
number and types of MMMFs in families can be explained by differences in the number 
 12
of other type of funds offered within the complex, and by the variety of investment 
objectives for non-MMMFs in the fund family.  
Thus, differences in fund characteristics, such as maturity, yield, and expenses 
across MMMFs can be explained by family-specific characteristics, including cash 
management and diversification strategies at the family level. Application of these 
strategies can reduce operating costs and improve overall performance at the family level. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the 
hypotheses and methodology for examining MMMFs. I provide data description and 
empirical analyses in Section 3, while Section 4 concludes the paper and offers research 
implications. 
 
2. Cross-sectional examination of money market mutual funds 
 MMMFs offer investors a relatively homogeneous product – short-term debt 
securities with relatively low risk. Choice of securities that can be used in money market 
portfolios is limited by regulations. Rule 2a-7 under the Investment Company Act of 
1940 specifies that money market funds may not acquire instruments with remaining 
maturity of greater than 397 days or will not maintain a dollar-weighted average portfolio 
maturity that exceeds 90 days. The rule also specifies portfolio quality and diversification 
that money market funds are to maintain, e.g. funds must limit investments to securities 
with minimal credit risk, and invest no more than five percent of the fund’s total net 
assets in second tier securities, or those of a single issuer. As the products are very 
similar, we would expect homogeneous characteristics among MMMFs, i.e. weighted 
average maturity, yields and expense ratios should not vary much. Therefore, one would 
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not expect widely different strategies and unique asset compositions across various 
money market funds. 
Early research on MMMFs focuses on the portfolio manager’s ability to predict 
interest rate fluctuations by examining the association between the portfolio’s average 
maturity and interest rate changes. Ferri and Oberhelman (1981), and Packer and Pencek 
(1990) analyze aggregate data for changes in MMMFs’ average maturity and subsequent 
changes in CD rates, finding evidence that managers, as a group, show some ability to 
predict future money market yields. Domian (1992), and Seyfried and Packer (2001) 
study the causality of the maturity-market yield relationship of MMMFs by utilizing 
Granger-causality tests and find that a relationship exists in the opposite direction from 
that suggested by previous studies. However, they still find that managers have the ability 
to predict changes in short-term interest rates.  
While earlier studies examine time series variations of MMMFs’ maturities, I 
focus on cross-sectional variations between MMMF characteristics. Consistent with 
earlier studies’ conclusions that find that MMMFs are actively managed, I conclude that 
MMMFs do vary significantly in important characteristics, including maturity, return, 
and expenses. This implies that, possibly, these funds are not passive portfolios and may 
serve purposes beyond those of simply transitional accounts. Detailed analysis of the data 
is provided in Section 3.  
 
2.1. Factors influencing MMMF returns 
Domian and Reichenstein (1997) examine the factors that affect the cross-section 
of net returns of MMMFs, and the persistence of relative returns across years, finding that 
 14
expense ratio is the most important factor in explaining difference between net returns, 
and that the MMMFs’ relative returns show strong persistence. I examine additional 
factors and find that it is not only expenses that determine cross-sectional variation of 
MMMF returns. 
The primary argument for observed differences in MMMF yields is that these 
funds pursue different risk levels, as investors and/or fund family may use MMMFs for 
different purposes and may have different risk preferences. DeGennaro and Domian 
(1996) examine time-series differences in MMMFs’ average maturity and conclude that 
managers select their target level for interest-rate risk. The question then is how managers 
decide what level of risk they are willing to take, and what securities they will use in their 
portfolios to provide the return corresponding to their chosen risk. The choice of the risk 
and the return is obtained by selecting securities with different returns and maturities. 
Returns are a composition of a risk free rate, default premium and maturity premium.2 
Therefore, changing quality and/or maturity of securities can alter returns. Adjustment of 
maturity premium has been addressed in previous studies; however, these studies except 
DeGennaro and Domian (1996) did not examine it as a choice of asset composition, but 
rather a response to expected rate changes.  
 Knez et al. (1994) identify the common factors that describe money market 
securities returns by using both three- and four-factor models, which include: (i) the level 
factor, which represents movements in yields; (ii) steepness, which represents changes in 
steepness of yield curve, i.e. relation to maturity; (iii) the Treasury factor, which captures 
                                                 
2 Which is a structure of a debt security return composition, and since MMMFs use only debt securities in 
their portfolios, I consider this structure. 
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credit risk in issues – credit risk in Treasury issues and, for private issuer, it includes bank 
risk and firm risk. An additional factor is a private issue factor. 
 Although common reasons for holding money market funds are liquidity and 
transaction services combined, MMMF investors may have additional reasons for 
utilizing these accounts. For those concerned about the safety of their investment, it is 
appropriate to place their money in accounts that include a portfolio of government 
securities, accepting lower return on the investment.3 For less risk-averse investors, 
higher returns in MMMFs with higher risk securities are more attractive. As investors 
choose equity mutual funds in different categories based on their risk-return preferences, 
and funds offer these choices, similarly, different MMMFs are offered to satisfy unique 
demands. This variety comes from diverse clientele, and is reflected in variety of 
portfolio asset compositions. 
 I test MMMFs for the factors determining their returns and predict that MMMFs 
with higher risk and higher weighted average maturity have higher returns. Based on 
Knez et al.’s (1994) return factors of money market securities, this prediction estimates 
the second and third parts of risk composition in return – risk (default) and maturity 
premiums. I employ the following model, which includes cross-sectional fund and 
economy related factors: 
tittitititifti InfTNAExpensesMaturityRiskrr t ,5,4,3,2,1, log εβββββα ++++++=−    (1) 
where, dependent variable ri,t is the yearly gross return of the MMMF i in year t 
calculated by annualizing monthly returns reported in the CRSP mutual fund database, 
and rft is the risk free rate available in the economy at the beginning of time t. Riski,t is 
                                                 
3 For extremely risk-averse investors, the choice will not include mutual funds, as banks offer money 
market accounts with FDIC insurance of up to $100,000. 
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measured as a monthly return’s standard deviation of the MMMF i in year t. Maturityi,t is 
a weighted average maturity of securities holdings of the MMMF i in year t measured in 
days. Expensesi,t and logTNAi,t are an expense ratio and the logarithm of total net assets of 
the MMMF i in year t, respectively. Inflation in the economy, Inft, is calculated as the 
change of consumer price index from December of year t-1 to year t. Finally, εi,t is the 
error term. 
I expect β1 and β2 to be positive, as the return should increase with risk and 
maturity premiums. The remaining variables are controls and included for the following 
reasons. Expense ratio is a proxy for better management, and, as better services cost 
more, I expect the coefficient of this variable to be positive. MMMFs with higher 
expense ratios should have better performance in the form of higher returns relative to 
other MMMFs. logTNAi,t is a proxy for the economy of scale, and its coefficient is 
expected to be positive, as larger MMMFs can be more flexible in a choice of securities’ 
maturity dates and would be expected to choose longer maturities, translating into higher 
returns. Thus, logTNAi,t may be a proxy for maturity as well.4  
Inflation is a macroeconomic factor, and its coefficient is expected to have a 
positive effect as a measure of the price change risk premium. Due to the Fisher’s effect, 
risk free rate may not fully reflect inflation, and there may be divergence between these 
two indicators, thus both are included in the model.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 To test this effect, I also run the model with exclusion of logTNAi,t. 
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2.2. Family factors 
 The majority of MMMFs are offered by complexes, i.e. fund families that manage 
other types of funds as well.5 As part of the complex, funds that have different objectives, 
e.g. growth, income, bond and others, have diverse risks, and may have unique needs in 
terms of cash when they face redemptions or purchases. Those risks and cash flows may 
interact among individual funds within the complex.  
 Fund families can provide additional benefits to investors in the form of potential 
for economies of scale and scope and also in terms of asset management, as they have 
larger pools of managerial sources, distribution externalities and better research qualities. 
A fund family also has its own objective function to maximize, which is related to fees 
generated from funds in the family. Thus, a fund family may engage in different 
strategies, such as cash management, risk management, and diversification, leading to a 
variety of structures of the MMMFs within the complex. 
 
2.2.1. Cash management 
Market transactions necessary to bring the fund cash level to the target are not 
free. It may be cheaper for fund managers to transfer cash and assets within a family 
through MMMFs, elevating the cash management function from the fund to the family 
level. It is possible to have no liquidity flows into or out of the family, and, therefore, no 
transaction costs. Anecdotal evidence of such strategy use is an example from Vanguard 
Funds family. In July of 2004, Vanguard launched an MMMF “available only to 
                                                 
5 There are cases in which a family offers only one category of mutual funds, including only MMMFs, e.g. 
Centennial Capital Corporation offers only MMMFs. Also, there are cases in which families do not have 
MMMFs. 
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Vanguard funds and certain trusts and accounts managed by Vanguard”.6 Thus, the 
family created a special MMMF for cash management purposes at the family level.  
The cash management strategy can work as follows. To illustrate, let us suppose 
an equity fund currently holds a target level of portfolio allocation, including the level of 
cash, and, at the same time, it faces cash inflow as it sells shares to new investors. Before 
the manager of this fund will use the cash to adjust the fund portfolio holdings to the 
target, he will put the cash in money market securities. An MMMF of the same family, 
when it faces redemption outflow, needs to sell money market securities to obtain cash. 
The funds can fulfill their needs by going to financial markets outside the family, or they 
can transfer assets within the family, without incurring transaction costs. The latter one 
should be preferred. Therefore, in this type of transaction, the MMMF’s role is to fulfill 
cash needs, not only of individual investors, but also that of other funds in the family. 
However, this pattern of fund flows is feasible if cash flows of the MMMF and the other 
funds of the family are highly negatively correlated or if the MMMF holds very short 
maturity securities that provide cash on regular basis, without a need to sell them, and 
without incurring additional transaction costs.7 Thus, the higher the flow volatility of 
other funds in the family, the higher the level of cash needed by the funds to meet their 
liquidity requirements; and therefore, if MMMFs play the role of family cash centers, the 
shorter the weighted average maturity of a MMMF.8 
                                                 
6 Vanguard Market Liquidity Fund, Semiannual Report 2005. 
7 However, holding securities with very short maturity may introduce additional transaction costs 
associated with reinvesting the cash. 
8 Chordia (1996) tests the hypothesis that cash and cash equivalents held by mutual funds increase with 
uncertainty about investor cash flows, and that cash flow volatility and finds that cash holdings increase 
with volatility.  
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Depending on the level of cash flow correlation among funds in a family, 
MMMFs can also play a different role. In the first scenario, all flows happen within a 
family, and no cash leaves the complex; thus, a closed system. For example, an equity 
fund had transferred some amount to a bond fund, the bond fund had transferred to some 
other equity fund, and the latter transferred to an MMMF. In this case, when all cash 
flows can be offset, to avoid any transaction fees, the complex should not sell and buy 
securities outside the family and all cash transfers should happen through an MMMF. 
In the second scenario, there is an inflow to an equity fund, and a manager of that 
fund places incoming cash into money market securities for some period of time.9 At the 
same time, an MMMF of the same fund family experiences outflow. If the MMMF acts 
as a cash center, then, instead of two outside transactions, there will be only one, or none, 
as money market securities can be moved to the equity fund in exchange for cash that 
will be used to fulfill withholdings from the MMMF’s shareholders. If the inflow and the 
outflow are perfectly correlated in time and absolute value, then no transaction is 
required. However, if the flows are not perfectly offset, but at least some of the flows are 
correlated, then a part of them can be transferred within the family, and the rest will incur 
transaction costs still lower than in the case that all transactions are done outside the 
family. 
However, if cash flows due to liquidity or portfolio rebalancing are one-sided, 
then flows of the equity fund (or the MMMF) cannot be offset and all of these flows will 
be transacted outside the family, and, therefore, will incur full cost. When possible, using 
                                                 
9 For simplicity, I ignore other funds in a complex; this does not change the logic and outcome of the 
strategy. 
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MMMFs as a cash center for a fund complex may reduce transaction costs, and therefore, 
increase proceeds to the family.  
 Thus, families that have funds with higher flow volatility face elevated need in 
terms of cash management. As a result, if families use MMMFs as cash centers, I predict 
that a family with funds of higher cash flow volatility will have MMMF(s) with more 
volatile cash flows and, in the case when the family actively manages these flows, shorter 
maturity.  
 As correlations between family funds’ flows and flows to MMMFs can be 
different across families, the flow volatilities and the asset compositions of the MMMFs 
are expected to differ, as are the extents to which MMMFs can be used as cash centers by 
the families. The following models are employed: 
i,ti,t6i,t5i,t4
i,t3i,t2i,t1i,t
εlogTNAfamβlogTNAmmfβrFamturnoveβ
CFCorβFCorCFVolFam*CβCFVolFamβαCFVolMMMF
+++
++++=
       (2) 
i,ti,t10i,t9
i,t8i,t7i,t6i,t5
i,t4i,t3i,t2i,t1i,t
εFamRevMMF/RevβFamMMFCorβ
rFamilyDiveβFamilyHIβCFVolMMMFβlogTNAfamβ
logTNAmmfβrFamturnoveβCFCorβCFVolFamβαMaturity
++
++++
+++++=
    (3) 
where CFVolMMMFi,t is the volatility of MMMFs’ cash flows in the family i, and 
CFVolFami,t is the volatility of cash flows of the other funds in the family i, calculated as 
a standard deviation of monthly cash flows in year t.10, 11 
                                                 
10 Cash flows to the MMMFs and to the family are calculated using Sirri and Tufano’s (1998) 
methodology. I use monthly TNA and returns to construct net cash flows. The flows are calculated 
as: )1(* ,1,,, titititi RTNATNAFlow +−= − , where TNA is MMMFs’ or the rest of the family i’s total net assets 
at time t, and R is the MMMFs’ or the rest of the family’s value weighted returns over the prior month. 
 
11 Christoffersen (2001) measures flows to MMMFs as a percentage change in assets, though she indicates 
that defining fund flows as 11, /)Re1(* −− +−= ttttti AssetsturnsNetAssetsAssetsFlow does not change the 
results of her study. Even though Christoffersen’s methodology may be justifiable for MMMFs, I use Sirri 
and Tufano’s (1998) methodology because I need to have consistent measures of fund flows for all types of 
fund investment objectives. 
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 I predict a positive relation between cash flow volatility of MMMFs and of the 
family. If there is such a relation, then families, as well as investors in the families, use 
MMMFs as cash centers. In addition, if maturity is a tool to manage cash and liquidity, 
then it should be negatively related to the volatility of cash flows of the family and the 
MMMFs. As volatility of the family’s cash flows increases, managers would shorten the 
maturity of MMMFs’ securities to release more cash for liquidity purposes and to avoid 
additional transaction costs.  
 CFCori,t is the correlation between net cash flows to MMMFs and to the rest of 
the funds in the family i. CFCori,t and CFVolFam* CFCori,t are control variables that 
allow monitoring as to whether it is a closed system of cash flows. The rest of the 
variables are controls and explicitly defined in the models for risk management 
predictions below. 
 
2.2.2. Loads and cash center 
 The previous discussion about the role of MMMFs in a fund family is from a 
family and managers’ point of view, i.e. how managers can optimize transactions in the 
family. On the other hand, MMMFs can play a role for an investor within the family. It is 
quite possible that existence of an MMMF within a family may play no role for an 
investor who has a position in other accounts of the family, as the investor can liquidate 
the position whenever he wants to and place cash in a money market account anywhere 
else outside the family, or vice versa. If funds other than MMMFs have front and/or back 
loads, then an investor will face additional expenses as a result of moving his money in or 
out of the fund. However, these fees are omitted if investors’ assets are moved within a 
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family. Massa (2003) shows that mutual fund families employ strategies that rely on the 
heterogeneity of investors in terms of investment horizon by offering the possibility to 
switch across different funds belonging to the same family, at no cost.  
Thus, for liquidity purposes, the MMMF in the family can be more attractive than 
outside money market accounts to an investor. Chordia (1996) develops a model and 
finds empirical evidence at the individual fund level, showing that redemption rates are 
higher in funds without load fees than in funds with fees and, therefore, cash holdings 
decrease with load fees. I have a similar argument, that there is a higher need for cash at 
the family level for a high load fund family, as transfers will be within the family, not 
outside. Massa (2003) argues that investors who are planning to reallocate their assets 
more frequently will tend to invest in funds with lower load fees and in funds that belong 
to larger families. I argue that families with higher average loads will experience more 
use of MMMFs by investors, who realize the option of a free move.  
I predict that a family with higher load funds includes a relatively larger 
MMMF(s), and a family with higher load funds has higher volatility of MMMF(s) cash 
flows. If investors move their assets among funds within a family, instead of through 
money market accounts outside the family, then volatility of the family’s MMMFs cash 
flows is higher than for those of a family that does not restrain investors from leaving the 
family by charging loads.  
Predictions are tested with the following models, which are similar to Chordia’s 
(1996) model of cash management tests at the fund level. The tests are conducted at the 
family level, where total net assets of MMMFs play a similar role in the family as assets 
invested in cash in a single fund.   
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where LIQi,t is a family liquidity ratio.12,13 AveFrontLoadi,t and AveBackLoadi,t are the 
value weighted average of front and back loads of the family i’s funds in year t, 
respectively.  
 I expect loads to be positively related to the family’s liquidity ratio, and to the 
volatility of the MMMFs’ cash flows. However, if loads discourage investors from 
leaving the individual funds in the first place, then the family will have less need for cash 
management of investors’ flows through MMMFs, as loads will fulfill that role at the 
fund level. Thus, loads would decrease the family liquidity ratio in a manner similar to 
that reported by Chordia (1996) at the fund level. It remains an empirical question as to 
whether investors are sensitive to loads and take advantage of free asset transfer options 
within the family. The other variables are controls: the sizes of MMMFs and families, as 
well as cash flow correlation may impact investors’ decisions to use the option of a free 
transfer, or on a family’s decision about money market securities allocation. 
 
2.2.3. Risk management 
There is a pool of existing literature that examines risk-taking strategies of mutual 
funds and risk strategies within fund families. The latter studies are of more interest to 
this paper, and the main question that they explore is as to whether fund families 
                                                 
12 
tifamMMMFti
TNATNALIQ
ti ,, ,
=  
13 Chordia (1998) measures liquidity ratio of a single fund as the cash and cash equivalents held by the fund 
as a percentage of the total assets. My measure of family liquidity ratio is conceptually the same. 
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maximize their own objective functions rather than pursuing the best risk adjusted return 
strategy for investors.  
The agency problem creates risk-taking behavior that is not necessarily in the best 
interests of an investor. Chevalier and Ellison (1997), among others, show that a non-
linear convex shape of flow-performance relation (Sirri and Tufano (1998)) creates 
incentive for a fund manager to increase or decrease fund risk, which depends on the 
fund’s year-to-date return. Managerial fees – revenues for a fund company – depend on 
the total assets under management, and, therefore, in order to maximize the fund 
objective function, the fund manager has an incentive to take actions that increase fund 
inflows from investors by changing risk, or using other actions that might conflict with 
investors’ interests.  
A conflict of interests may exist as family affiliations may influence the 
incentives of fund managers away from its shareholders interests, if the whole family is 
going to benefit from a particular strategy. Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2006), and Guedj 
and Papastaikoudi (2003) argue that families support better performing and/or higher fee 
funds in order to maximize proceeds to the family and, therefore, to maximize the 
family’s objective function. This family strategy of “favoritism” can be in the form of 
“cross-fund subsidization”, by shifting performance across funds (Gaspar et al. (2006)) as 
well as through limited resources allocation across funds (Guedj and Papastaikoudi 
(2003)). However, family objective function maximization can also be in a form of cash 
and risk management and diversification at the family level, which can reduce costs of 
running family funds, with little or no performance disturbance. 
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Massa (1998) develops a model of mutual fund industry structure that explains the 
role of fund families. He argues that as “…consumers pick the funds on the basis of the 
whole bundle of services they provide…” fund-managing companies behave as multi-
product firms. A fund family can hedge risk using category proliferation as it makes the 
overall portfolio of the fund family more diversified. It can be argued that, in an efficient 
market, an investor can achieve desired diversification on his own, so that there is no 
need for a fund family to do so for him. However, two explanations for family 
diversification exist. The first is that families offer other services that make 
diversification for an investor within a family more attractive than doing it on his/her 
own. The second is that a family may want to diversify in order to reduce its risk in a 
process of maximizing its own objective function. Thus, to attract more investors’ assets, 
families manage risk to capture a larger share of investors with various risk preferences, 
which is reflected in clientele effect as well, as discussed in the following section. 
If a fund family comprises high-risk securities, then, to offset the risk, the 
family’s MMMFs would be expected to hold less risky and/or shorter maturity securities, 
and vise versa. I predict that risk and maturity of MMMF(s) of a fund family are 
negatively related to the risk of the family. Thus, differences in risk taking across 
MMMFs can come from diverse risk preferences of investors, from cross-sectional 
differences of an MMMF’s return factors, and from risk diversification of a family 
portfolio. Tests are based on the following models conducted at the family level: 
titititititi TNAfamTNAmmfrFamturnoveFamilyriskRisk ,,4,3,2,1, loglog εββββα +++++=  (6) 
titititititi TNAfamTNAmmfrFamturnoveFamilyriskMaturity ,,4,3,2,1, loglog εββββα +++++=  (7) 
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where, Riski,t and Maturityi,t are different from the variables used to test composition of 
MMMFs’ returns. Riski,t is the standard deviation of monthly value weighted average 
returns and Maturityi,t is the value weighted average maturity of all MMMFs in the 
family i in year t. Familyriski,t is the weighted average volatility of i family’s returns, 
measured by finding monthly weighted average returns of the family portfolio, excluding 
MMMFs, and then calculating the standard deviation of those returns over the year t. 
Famturnoveri,t is the value weighted average turnover of the family’s portfolios, 
excluding MMMFs. logTNAmmfi,t and logTANfami,t are the logarithm of total net assets 
of the MMMFs and of the family i, respectively, in year t.  
 Elton et al. (2003), Brown et al. (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1999), and Kempf 
and Ruenzi (2004) use the volatility of monthly returns as a measure of risk. Chevalier 
and Ellison (1999) employ an ordinary least squares method (OLS) with risk as a 
dependent variable. I also use an OLS method on pooled data to test risk management 
predictions. GLM procedure controls for the family fixed effects of the panel data with 
family dummy variables. If families use MMMFs as a tool to control family risk, then for 
both equations, I expect β1 to be negative, as higher risk families will choose lower risk 
and lower maturity MMMFs to diversify their portfolios. Famturoveri,t is a control 
variable, and its higher value will require a lower maturity of MMMF’s securities, in 
order to free some cash and reduce transaction costs. logTNAmmfi,t and logTANfami,t are 
controls.  
Families have different degrees of concentration in a specific objective type, 
different number of fund objectives, and a unique risk correlation among funds in a 
family. For instance, a bond fund will have higher risk correlation with an MMMF, as 
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both use debt securities in their portfolios and are dependent on yield structure, and, thus, 
observe the same direction of risks. In contrast, if a family comprises mostly equity 
funds, then different objectives within equity funds may offset risks of each other. 
Therefore, the role of an MMMF for family risk control purposes is more important in a 
single fund type family, or in a more concentrated family, than for a family with less risk 
correlation.  
 As a fund family has the desire to capture as much of investors’ assets as possible, 
it would offer a diverse set of funds to catch investors’ heterogeneity. In a diversified 
family, investors need not go outside the family for diversification reasons. Khorana and 
Servaes (2004) find that product differentiation is effective in obtaining market share. 
Elton et al (2005) suggest that a correlation between funds within a family may be higher 
than outside the family, and that the risk level in the family may be different from what 
can be obtained from family diversification.  
To account for the level of in-family correlation, diversification, and the risk 
correlation of the other funds with MMMFs’ risk, I propose the following with regard to 
the family risk management strategy. A family with higher concentration in a single 
objective category has an MMMF(s) with lower risk and shorter maturity. A family with 
higher positive correlation in risk between funds has an MMMF(s) with lower risk and 
shorter maturity. The following models are used to test the predictions. 
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where, Riski,t and Maturityi,t are at the family level, as defined in the previous test. 
FamilyHIi,t represents family Herfindahl index, which measures concentration of the 
family i in a specific objective besides that of its MMMFs. The Herfindahl index is 
defined as the sum of the squares of the family funds’ assets in each objective category as 
a proportion of the family’s total assets.  
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where, TNAji is total net assets in fund’s objective j in family i and N is the number of 
objective styles in family i. Based on the same reasoning for usage, and on closeness of 
the sample periods, I follow Massa (2003) and use ICDI_OBJ out of three potential sets 
of categories available in CRSP, which includes 23 different objectives. FamilyHIi equals 
one if a family has only one objective type across its funds, and it is between zero and 
one when a family has more than one objective type. Thus, the lower the value of 
FamilyHIi, the less concentrated the family. 
Another proxy for family diversification is FamilyDiveri,t, which is defined here 
as one minus a standard deviation of the residual (σε) from the Fama-French five-factor 
model, which captures idiosyncratic risk that is not diversified away by a family 
portfolio. Thus, the larger the value of σε, the smaller the value of FamilyDiveri,t variable, 
the less diversified the portfolio. The model to obtain σε is as follows:14 
ttttttttt DEFTERMHMLSMBRFRMRFR εβββββα +++++−+=− 54321 ][   (11) 
                                                 
14 Variables definitions are the same as in Fama and French (1993). The two out of seven Fama and 
French’s (1993) bond portfolios used as dependent variables in the excess return regressions, are 5-year 
government bonds and corporate bonds rated Aaa. 
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 FamilyMMFCori,t measures risk correlation between the family i’s and MMMF’s 
portfolios in year t. It is a correlation between monthly returns on MMMFs’ portfolio and 
the value weighted returns on the family’s portfolio, excluding MMMFs, in year t.  
I also include as a control variable percentage of fee revenues generated by 
MMMFs relative to fee revenues of its whole family. These revenues are measured as an 
expense ratio multiplied by TNA. Familyrisk*FamMMFCori,t is the interaction term 
included to control for the correlation effect on family risk. The rest of the variables are 
as defined before.  
I expect a negative relation between family concentration (FamilyHIi,t) and risk 
level and maturity of MMMFs’ portfolios within the family. A positive sign is expected 
on the family diversification (FamilyDiveri,t) variable, i.e. more diversified families will 
require less risk management through MMMFs. FamilyMMFCori,t controls for whether 
there is room for risk management, and is expected to be negative, as lower correlation 
will allow more possibilities for using diversification strategies. 
 
2.2.4. Clientele 
 For transitional accounts and cash management, a family requires only one 
MMMF. However, in reality, families have more than one (See Table 3).15 The reason 
can be attributed to the clientele effect among investors. Families have different MMMF 
categories and investment objectives, such as taxable and tax-exempt, retail and 
institutional.16 Massa (2003) finds evidence of family-driven heterogeneity among funds 
                                                 
15 For example, the Federated Securities Corporation family has 105 MMMFs, including share classes. 
16 Some examples of MMMF objectives, according to ICDI fund objective codes include: MF – Money 
Market Tax Free Funds, which invest in municipal obligations that are close to maturity; MQ – High 
Quality Municipal Bond Funds, which invest in municipal securities rated BBB or better; among others. 
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and shows that families actively exploit it. He argues that when it is very costly to 
compete on the performance dimension alone, the family will focus on other ways of 
attracting investors, such as by reducing fees or increasing the number of funds within the 
family. 
As investors prefer different risks and pursue different strategies in their 
portfolios, they may require different levels of risk and return from MMMFs as well. 
Families that pursue a strategy of broad investor coverage in terms of fund investment 
objectives should have more MMMFs with different investment styles. I predict that the 
higher the number of fund styles within a family, the greater the number of MMMFs with 
different characteristics and investment objectives that are offered by that family.  
This prediction is in line with the family risk management strategy, and is more 
pronounced for higher loads fund families. The higher the number of funds within the 
family, the greater the value of the switching option, because the effective fees decrease 
as a function of the number of funds. The OLS regression is estimated based on the 
following models, controlling for family fixed effects: 
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where proxies for dependent variable are: the number of MMMFs offered by the family i 
– MMMFNumi,t, the number of MMMFs’ investment objectives offered by the family i – 
MMMFObjNumi,t, and Herfindahl index of MMMFs in the family i – MMMFHIi,t.  
FamObjNumi,t is the number of style objectives in the family i, excluding money 
market, and FamFundNumi,t is the number of funds in the family i besides MMMFs. The 
rest of the variables are as previously defined. For the dependent variables MMMFNumi,t 
and MMMFObjNumi,t, β1 and β2 are expected to be positive as increased number of fund 
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objectives and more funds within the family will indicate greater investor heterogeneity, 
therefore, higher numbers of MMMFs with different investment styles will be required. 
For the dependent variable MMMFHIi,t, the sign is expected to be the opposite, as 
MMMFHIi,t measures the concentration, and its higher value indicates less variety in the 
family’s MMMFs. The signs on loads should be the same as in predictions for loads 
effect in “cash centers”, indicating investors’ use of other funds in the family. The 
remaining variables are controls and are as previously defined. Two of the dependent 
variables are count data, and, to overcome restriction of OLS assumption of continuous 
normal distribution of a dependent variable, I use the Poisson regression model with these 
variables and control for the family fixed effects. 
 
2.2.5. Family effects 
In addition to cash and risk management, and clientele predictions, which try to 
explain cross-sectional differences between MMMFs, it is possible that a family has other 
specific effects that determine differences. For example, the family can have generally 
higher expenses for all funds, and, therefore, MMMFs from that family would have 
higher levels of expenses as well, compared to MMMFs from other families. These 
higher expenses should be compensated for by higher returns, as funds that show 
enhanced performance that is achieved through better management, require higher fees 
for that expertise. 
I predict that the higher the average levels of expense ratios for a family, the 
higher the expense ratios of the MMMFs in that family. An MMMF with a higher 
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expense ratio should show better performance in the form of higher gross returns relative 
to other MMMFs, controlling for maturity of underlying assets.  
  A test of the first part of this prediction is combined with the return composition 
test, as defined above. The second part is tested at the fund level, as follows: 
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where, Expensesi,t is the MMMF’s i and AveExpensesFami,t is the rest of the family’s 
value weighted average expense ratios. Β2 is expected to be positive, reflecting overall 
family strategies in fee settings. The other variables are controls. 
 
3. Data description and empirical results  
 The primary data source for this study is the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) survivor-bias free US mutual fund database. I limited the study period to 
1992-2004 because CRSP data have many missing observations prior to 1992. Net asset 
value equal to one is used to identify MMMFs.17 I drop the fund observations with TNA 
less than $10 million, leaving 13,427 fund-year observations of MMMFs. Descriptive 
statistics of the money market mutual fund-year data, yearly and over the entire period of 
the study, are presented in Table 1. The data show that there is substantial cross-sectional 
variation among the MMMFs in the variables presented in the table. For example, the 
standard deviation of the weighted average maturity is 17 days with a mean (median) of 
45 (46) days. A similar picture is observed for expenses: standard deviation is 0.29%, 
with the mean (median) of 0.60 (0.59)%, and for the gross return: standard deviation is 
1.72% with the mean (median) of 3.75 (3.82)%.  
                                                 
17 I also check ICDI’s fund objective code and portfolio holdings to be fully invested in cash.  
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 Table 2 exhibits statistics based on the number of MMMFs across families, by 
year and for the entire sample period. Columns 2 and 3 report total numbers of families 
available in the mutual fund industry, and of the families that have MMMFs, 
respectively. Although it may appear that families with MMMFs represent less than half 
of the number of all families, Table 3 shows that, in terms of TNA, the families with 
MMMFs are larger, and represent the majority of the mutual fund industry – they had 
more than 90 percent of the mutual fund industry asset share as of December 2004. It is 
noticeable as well that the average number of MMMFs in a family has increased from 
four to almost ten funds, and the median number has changed from two to four funds per 
family, during the same time period. The number of families that offer MMMFs varies 
over the years, with a peak occurring in 2000, which can be explained by waves in the 
economy and popularity of different investment products.18  
 Most of the tests used in this study are for fund-family relations. First, using the 
list of MMMFs that I obtained, I selected all funds that were in the same family as the 
MMMF. Some of the families that were initially selected based on the presence of 
MMMFs did not have other types of funds. Therefore, for the predictions that require 
families with funds other than money market, I drop the MMMF-only families from the 
sample.  
 Other sources of the data are as follows. Fama-French three factors are obtained 
from Wharton Research Data Services. Interest rates of securities with different 
maturities and ratings come from Federal Reserve Bank reports. Inflation rate is 
calculated from the consumer price index (CPI) as reported by US Department of Labor.  
                                                 
18 The total number of families was the largest in 2000 as well. 
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 The first set of results is from fund level tests, excluding family effects. Some of 
the differences in the MMMFs’ characteristics can be explained by differing risk-return 
strategies that various MMMFs pursue. Table 5 reports the factors that affect returns for 
MMMFs. Coefficient on the Riski,t variable is positive, as expected, and statistically 
significant at less than 1-percent level, however, maturity has almost zero effect. 
Coefficient on the LogTNAi,t variable has a positive sign, as expected, confirming that 
there is an economy of scale effect similar to bond funds, as reported by Philpot et al. 
(1998). Testing the model without LogTNAi,t does not confirm the assumption that the 
size of an MMMF can be a close proxy for maturity, as the coefficient of Maturityi,t does 
not change much. Inflation has a positive sign as expected. Expenses are positively 
related to gross returns, which are consistent with the prediction that funds with higher 
fees should have higher returns, as fees should reflect managerial abilities. These results 
are statistically significant at less than 1-percent level.  
 The cash center prediction results are reported in Table 6. As expected, cash flow 
volatility of the family and MMMFs are positively related at less than 5-percent level. 
Cash flows correlation and the interaction term of the family cash flow volatility and cash 
flow correlation, used as control variables for indicating an open or closed system, are 
positively related to MMMFs’ cash flow volatility, emphasizing the result of the main 
variable. Thus, there is an indication that families use MMMFs as cash centers by 
clearing appropriate cash and securities transactions within a family through MMMFs.  
If money market securities’ maturities were used as a means to conduct a cash 
management strategy, then a negative relation between an MMMFs’ maturity and family 
cash flow volatility would be expected. Results for CFVolFami,t variable in this model 
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are not significant. Thus, although families use MMMFs as cash centers, the families do 
not use active cash management strategies by controlling maturity of MMMFs’ 
portfolios.  
Family cash management activities performed through MMMFs may have some 
effect on expenses in MMMFs, as additional costs associated with these activities may 
exist. I test whether cash flow volatility of MMMFs affects their expense ratios. Results 
reported in Table 7 demonstrate that expenses do not increase with MMMFs’ cash flow 
volatility. Thus, the benefits of these strategies may outweigh additional costs.19 
The level of MMMF assets across families is reported in Table 4. The percentage 
of the TNA of MMMFs in the TNA of the family, identified here as a measure of the 
family’s liquidity, varies substantially across families. Specifically, the mean is 34.86%, 
with a standard deviation of 29.88%. Thus, there is cross-sectional variation in the level 
of “cash” allocation at the family level, suggesting that families have different cash 
management strategies depending on family characteristics. 
Results for load effect on family liquidity ratio and cash flow volatility of 
MMMFs are reported in Table 8. With control for family fixed effects, results indicate 
that front loads are positively related to family liquidity ratio, as expected. As investors 
pay front load fees only once at the entry to the family, they choose to move their assets 
within the family. Therefore, there is enhanced need for money market securities as 
transitional accounts within the family, and MMMFs serve that purpose for investors. 
Back loads have different effects. Back loads are negatively related to family liquidity 
ratios. It is possible that funds that impose back loads attract investors with long-term 
                                                 
19 However, even if there is a cost of running the cash management strategy at the family level, it cannot be 
passed on to individual investors in MMMFs. As all family investors enjoy the benefits, the costs can be 
reflected in the expense ratios of all funds within the family. 
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investment horizons. Chordia (1996) suggests that there is separation between investors 
who trade in and out of a fund often and those who stay for a long period of time. 
Precisely, lower turnover investors choose funds with loads in order to avoid loss in value 
to actively trading investors. Therefore, there is self-selection among investors. Thus, 
back loads attract long-term investors who do not intend to trade out of the fund, and 
higher back loads discourage short-term investors who might use family cash centers for 
trading purposes.    
The effect of loads on MMMFs’ cash flow volatility is as follows. When loads are 
separated into front and back, then results are not conclusive, as they lack statistical 
significance. However, total family loads are positively related to MMMF cash flow 
volatility, which is consistent with my predictions. As higher loads make it more 
attractive for investors to move their assets within the family through the cash center, so 
the cash flow volatility of MMMFs increases.  
 Tests of the risk management predictions reveal the following picture. Results of 
univariate analysis of families, with and without MMMFs, as presented in Table 3, 
indicate that families that do not have MMMFs have higher risk than those families that 
do. Specifically, the mean value of risk for the former is 4.2% with a standard deviation 
of 2.9%, versus mean value of risk for the latter, which excludes MMMFs, is 3.1% with a 
standard deviation of 2.2%. Even more, after MMMFs are included into the calculation, 
mean value of a family risk becomes 2.2%, with a standard deviation of 2.1%. Thus, 
there is self-selection of the families in terms of risk, and families that have MMMFs are 
less risky, using money market funds to control their risk. Differences in means are 
statistically significant, at less than 1-percent.  
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 Results of regression analyses of the risk management strategies are reported in 
Table 9. Panel A includes results for the first proxy of a dependent variable – standard 
deviation of MMMF returns, which measures overall risk of the money market portfolios. 
In Eq. (6), risk of MMMFs is positively related to the family risk with statistical 
significance at less than 1-percent level, which is opposite of what was expected, if 
families were to use MMMFs for risk management strategies. One explanation of this 
result is that families with higher levels of risk choose higher risk investments for their 
money market funds as well, though univariate analysis indicates that families with 
MMMFs do have lower risk.  
As reported in panel B, with maturity as a dependent variable, the coefficient on 
family risk is negative, as expected, with significance at 10-percent level for OLS 
regression.20 Maturity measures part of the overall risk and this result indicates that 
families perform some risk management strategies through adjusting maturity of money 
market portfolios. Results for the control variables have the following explanation. 
Family turnover is negatively related to maturity, indicating that as turnover increases, 
families control increased trading activity with shortening maturity of their MMMFs. 
Size of MMMFs is positively related to maturity, indicating that larger money market 
funds can afford to have longer maturity for their portfolios as they may have more 
liquidity, due to differing expirations of their holdings.  
 The results of Eq. (8) and (9) tests for family concentration and the level of family 
diversification are reported in both panels under Model 2. I expect that risk management 
strategies are more often required for more concentrated and less diversified families, and 
are more feasible with MMMFs whose risk is less correlated with the risk of the rest of 
                                                 
20 With control for family fixed effects, the power of some of the variables in the test diminishes.  
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the family’s portfolio. Panel A reports results for the overall risk dependent variable, 
where the results for common variables are consistent with those of Eq. (6), as reported in 
Model 1. I find that MMMF risk is positively related to family diversification, as 
expected, and is highly significant at less than 1-percent level; indicating that more 
diversified families have less need to employ diversification and risk management 
strategies through MMMFs, and vice versa. Correlation between MMMFs and family 
risk is positive, which is consistent with the finding that MMMF and family risks are 
positively related.  
 Panel B reports similar results for the other risk proxy – maturity. The coefficients 
of family Herfindahl index (FamilyHIi,t), diversification (FamilyDiveri,t) and risk 
correlation (FamMMFCori,t) have signs as expected.21 Concentration of a family is 
negatively related to Maturityi,t, i.e. more concentrated families choose shorter MMMF 
maturity to control for family risk. The correlation between MMMF and family risks is 
negatively related to MMMF maturity, as expected, indicating that for the lower 
correlation families, use of MMMFs for family risk management strategies is more 
feasible. 
Risk and cash management strategies may affect the level of family returns. I 
conduct univariate analysis of the value weighted family net returns for both types of 
families – with and without MMMFs. This approach limits the ability to separate effect 
of these strategies on returns, so I can conclude only about joint effect. Table 3 shows 
that families without MMMFs, on average, have higher returns than MMMF families, 
though this may be due to the fact that the former have higher risk in their portfolios, and 
so are compensated for that risk. Indeed, the average level of risk for families without 
                                                 
21 However, statistical power is lost for many variables when using the control for family fixed effects. 
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MMMFs is 4.17%, versus the average level of risk of 3.05 (2.22)% for families with 
MMMFs, excluding (including) MMMFs. Risk and cash management strategies may 
generate higher risk adjusted returns. I can make some conclusions about the effect of 
cash management strategy by examining the levels of expense ratios. Families that have 
MMMFs, on average, have lower expense ratios (1.00% including, and 1.14% excluding, 
MMMFs, versus 1.40% without MMMFs), which may be achieved by reduced 
transaction costs.  
 Results of the clientele tests are reported in Table 10. To check for the robustness 
of the results, I perform both OLS and Poisson analyses with family fixed effects, the 
latter of which are specifically designed for count data tests. Results show that there is a 
clientele effect in the families, which is reflected in the number of MMMFs and their 
various investment objectives. The number of funds and the number of investment 
objectives in a family are both positively related to the number of MMMFs offered by 
that family. With the use of the number of MMMF objectives as a dependent variable, the 
number of family objectives is also positively related. Though, the total number of funds 
offered by the family has mixed results, I can infer that, as there is more investor 
heterogeneity in fund families, those families offer more MMMFs of different styles to 
meet a broad range of investors’ needs. Use of MMMFs’ Herfindahl index as a dependent 
variable shows results consistent with the above findings. Thus, the clientele effect is 
found to be present.  
 This paper’s final set of analyses tests whether family characteristics determine 
cross sectional differences between MMMFs in terms of both expenses and other 
variables. Table 7 shows that the family level of expense ratios determines those of the 
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MMMFs within the family. The coefficient on the value weighted average expense ratio 
of the family is positive and highly significant, which is consistent with my prediction. 
Also, as reported in Table 5, expense ratios of MMMFs are positively related to gross 
returns of the funds, which is consistent with the prediction that higher fees result from 
compensation for better management.  
  
4. Conclusion 
 In this paper, I examine cross-sectional differences between money market mutual 
funds during the period 1992-2004. I find evidence that fund families and their investors 
often use MMMFs as cash centers, since family cash flow volatility is positively related 
to MMMF cash flow volatility. In addition, I discover that loads affect a fund family’s 
liquidity ratio, level of MMMF assets, and cash flow volatility of MMMFs. Using an 
option of free asset transfer within a family, investors assign MMMFs the function of a 
cash center within the family, as well. The results of this study demonstrate that both 
front and back loads play different roles in discouraging investors from moving assets in 
or out, at the fund level, and, therefore, offer unique roles for cash management tasks at 
the family level. Investors in funds with back-end loads tend not to use MMMFs for 
transitional purposes within the family. These results are consistent with the self-selection 
of investors found in Chordia (1996), in which back-end loads are found to attract only 
investors who do not intend to move their assets, even within a family. In contrast, front-
end loads have the opposite effect, confirming my prediction that front loads have a 
positive relation with a family’s liquidity ratio. Total loads are also positively related to 
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an MMMF’s cash flow volatility. Thus, the cash management function is shifted to the 
family level.  
As a result of analysis, I find that MMMF returns are determined by risk factors, 
such as risk of MMMFs’ portfolios, expenses and size of funds, as well as 
macroeconomic factors. This provides a glimpse into the root causes of influences in the 
observed cross-sectional differences between MMMFs’ returns at the fund level. In 
addition, the results suggest that fund families use MMMFs for risk management 
purposes. Univariate analysis shows that families with MMMFs have lower risk than 
those without MMMFs. Using two proxies for the risk measure – standard deviation of 
MMMFs’ returns and maturity of MMMFs’ portfolios – in regression analysis, I find that 
MMMF risk decreases as families are less diversified and more concentrated. 
In addition, I look for a clientele effect, in the effort to explain variety among 
MMMFs and their investment styles across families. This variety is explained by the 
diversity in the numbers and investment objectives of the family’s other funds. I can 
conclude that families with more investor heterogeneity offer more MMMFs, of different 
types, to meet investors’ needs. This is an indication of the presence of a clientele effect.  
 Family characteristics also determine cross-sectional differences between 
MMMFs with regard to expenses. I find that MMMF expenses are positively related to 
the value weighted average expenses of the family, and that expense ratios of MMMFs 
are positively related to gross returns of the funds.  
 Contrary to the perception that MMMFs are simply homogeneous transitional 
“cash” accounts, this paper finds that MMMFs play a larger role than one might expect 
within a mutual fund family. The characteristics of MMMFs differ substantially in the 
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cross-section, and these differences can be explained by family-specific characteristics, 
including diversification and cash management strategies at the family level. Application 
of these strategies can reduce operating costs and improve overall performance at the 
family level, which may translate into significant investor benefits.     
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Table 1.1. Descriptive Statistics of the MMMFs 
 
The table reports descriptive statistics for 13,427 fund-year observations of the MMMFs during the 1992-
2004 period. Data source is CRSP mutual funds. Variables: TNA – total net assets – measured in millions 
of dollars, Maturity – weighted average maturity – measured in days, Expenses – expense ratio – measured 
in percentage, Return – yearly gross return of MMMFs – measured in percentage, and Risk – standard 
deviation of monthly returns.  N is the number of funds. 
 
Year 
Statistics 
TNA, 
$ mln 
Maturity, 
days 
Expenses, 
% 
Return, 
% 
Risk, 
% 
   
1992 Mean 623.1 52.8 0.64 3.71 0.04
N=679 Std Dev 1610.3 17.3 0.27 0.51 0.01
1993 Mean 628.4 39.6 0.61 3.03 0.01
N=740 Std Dev 1545.5 21.2 0.25 0.40 0.01
1994 Mean 566.2 48.1 0.60 3.85 0.06
N=665 Std Dev 1628.1 18.2 0.28 0.69 0.02
1995 Mean 648.7 46.3 0.60 5.33 0.02
N=812 Std Dev 1850.0 17.8 0.27 1.03 0.02
1996 Mean 672.3 45.8 0.60 4.88 0.02
N=991 Std Dev 1985.5 16.3 0.27 0.96 0.01
1997 Mean 822.3 46.7 0.59 5.00 0.02
N=1,138 Std Dev 2352.8 16.3 0.27 0.98 0.03
1998 Mean 1005.6 46.2 0.60 4.93 0.02
N=1,206 Std Dev 2964.1 15.1 0.30 1.01 0.04
1999 Mean 1167.0 48.8 0.61 4.58 0.03
N=1,201 Std Dev 3497.3 14.9 0.30 0.91 0.01
2000 Mean 1260.1 43.9 0.60 5.71 0.04
N=1,219 Std Dev 3684.2 15.2 0.30 1.10 0.02
2001 Mean 1534.5 43.6 0.62 3.82 0.09
N=1,207 Std Dev 4343.0 15.5 0.32 0.68 0.02
2002 Mean 1538.1 43.8 0.62 1.78 0.01
N=1,168 Std Dev 4281.6 15.0 0.33 0.20 0.01
2003 Mean 1333.5 48.0 0.60 1.21 0.01
N=1,365 Std Dev 3689.1 15.7 0.31 0.15 0.01
2004 Mean 1274.4 37.2 0.58 1.35 0.03
N=1,036 Std Dev 3610.2 16.2 0.27 0.11 0.01
   
1992-2004 Mean 1067.5 45.4 0.60 3.75 0.03
N=13,427 Std Dev 3203.5 16.7 0.29 1.72 0.03
 10th Pctl. 33.5 24.7 0.24 1.26 0.01
 25th Pctl. 86.7 35.5 0.43 1.95 0.01
 Median 261.5 46.4 0.59 3.82 0.02
 75th Pctl. 776.8 55.2 0.75 5.42 0.04
 90th Pctl. 2319.2 66.1 0.95 5.87 0.07
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Table 1.2. Number of MMMFs across Families 
 
This table presents the distribution of money market funds across families. Data source is CRSP mutual 
funds database. Variables: All families – total number of families in the industry, Families w/MMMF – 
number of families with MMMFs. The rest of the variables describe the number of money market funds in 
a family. 
 
Year 
All 
Families 
Families 
w/MMMF Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl. Median 75th Pctl. 
1992 430 204 4.31 7.75 1 2 5
1993 436 209 4.95 9.72 1 2 5
1994 452 207 5.48 10.61 1 3 6
1995 448 208 6.07 11.83 1 2 6.5
1996 469 206 6.36 12.79 1 3 6
1997 503 210 6.73 12.57 1 3 8
1998 504 205 6.76 12.05 1 3 8
1999 534 201 6.81 12.14 1 3 6
2000 597 224 6.52 10.83 1 4 7.5
2001 591 214 7.06 12.00 1 3.5 8
2002 566 196 7.86 13.39 1 4 8
2003 564 194 8.44 14.14 2 4 8
2004 578 186 9.36 14.81 2 4 10
1992-2004 750 323 6.64 12.02 1 3 7
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Table 1.3. Univariate Analysis of the Mutual Fund Familys’ Risk, Return, Expenses, and Total Net Assets 
 
The table reports descriptive statistics of mutual fund families with and without MMMFs during the 1992-2004 time period. Risk is measured as standard 
deviation of the monthly weighted average net returns of the family reported in the table as Return. Expenses are value weighted expense ratios for the family. 
Risk, Return, and Expenses are expressed in percentage. Total Net Assets (TNA) is measured in millions of dollars. N reports the number of family-year 
observations.  
 
 
 N Mean Std Dev Minimum 10th Pctl. 25th Pctl. Median 75th Pctl. 90th Pctl. Maximum 
Panel A: Mutual Fund Families without MMMFs (µ1) 
Risk 2,472 4.17 2.92 0.11 1.34 2.31 3.53 5.27 7.37 27.30
Return 2,472 10.62 22.47 -79.11 -14.20 -1.51 9.70 21.06 33.56 286.53
Expenses 2,472 1.40 0.59 0.06 0.83 1.02 1.31 1.69 2.00 10.67
TNA 2,472 973.0 3312.1 10.0 17.4 41.3 147.3 520.9 2225.6 71860.2
Panel B: Mutual Fund Families with MMMFs, excluding MMMFs (µ2) 
Risk 2,909 3.05 2.19 0.08 1.09 1.61 2.57 3.89 5.45 28.80
Return 2,909 9.32 17.10 -51.85 -9.52 -1.27 9.73 17.73 25.62 255.24
Expenses 2,909 1.14 0.47 0.00 0.63 0.87 1.07 1.36 1.70 4.31
TNA 2,909 13012.0 49613.1 10.0 95.4 326.7 1471.5 6891.5 26634.3 748707.7
Panel C: Mutual Fund Families with MMMFs, including MMMFs (µ3) 
Risk 3,089 2.22 2.14 0.00 0.27 0.84 1.69 3.00 4.60 28.80
Return 3,089 7.83 14.62 -51.85 -5.51 1.30 6.68 13.33 21.41 255.24
Expenses 3,089 1.00 0.46 0.00 0.51 0.70 0.92 1.24 1.56 3.93
TNA 3,089 17223.5 59224.5 10.0 127.4 527.5 2230.4 9697.7 40064.8 902979.5
Panel D: Difference in means Risk Return  Expenses TNA
µ1- µ3 1.96 *** 2.79 *** 0.39 *** -16,251 *** 
µ1- µ2 1.12 *** 1.30 ** 0.26 *** -12,039 *** 
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Table 1.4. Descriptive Statistics of Families with MMMFs 
 
The table reports descriptive statistics of the families with MMMFs during the 1992-2004 time period. Data source is CRSP mutual funds. Variables: 
TNAMMF/TNAFam is the ratio, as a percentage, of the total net assets of a family’s money market funds to the total assets of the family, i.e. a liquidity measure 
of the family’s money market funds securities holdings, RevenueMMF/RevenueFam is the percentage of fee revenues generated by the MMMFs relative to fee 
revenues of the other funds in the family, FrontLoad is the value weighted average front loads of the family, BackLoad is the value weighted average back loads 
of the family, ExpensesMMMF is the value weighted average expense ratios of the MMMFs in the family, and ExpensesFam is the value weighted average 
expense ratios of the other funds in the family, measured in percentage. CFvolMMMF and CFvolFam are volatility of flows to MMMFs and to other funds of the 
family respectively. CFcor is the correlation between cash flows to MMMFs and cash flows to the other funds in the family. N reports the number of year-family 
observations.  
 
 N Mean Std Dev Minimum 10th Pctl 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl 90th Pctl Maximum
TNAMMF/TNAFam 2,157 34.86 29.88 0.01 2.56 7.52 25.82 59.93 79.63 99.45
RevenueMMF/RevenueFam 2,151 27.38 27.27 0.00 1.59 4.47 16.13 45.61 69.34 100.00
FrontLoad 2,152 1.60 1.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.46 3.48 4.50 8.03
BackLoad 2,152 0.42 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 1.44 5.00
ExpensesMMMF 2,144 0.64 0.25 0.00 0.32 0.45 0.61 0.79 0.97 2.00
ExpensesFam 2,152 1.08 0.41 0.00 0.61 0.84 1.03 1.29 1.60 4.29
CFvolMMMF 2,156 285.46 884.36 0.04 3.89 11.81 44.03 184.48 714.22 19639.51
CFvolFam 2,157 352.46 1186.58 0.07 4.39 14.19 61.15 221.66 636.17 18558.55
CFcor 2,156 -0.06 0.42 -1.00 -0.59 -0.33 -0.07 0.20 0.48 1.00
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Table 1.5. MMMFs’ Return Composition 
 
The table reports results from estimating pooled OLS and Fund and Year Fixed effects regressions of the 
factors determining returns of MMMFs at the fund level for the sample of 13,427 fund-years over the 1992-
2004 period. The estimated coefficients are from regressions of the following equation: 
tittitititifti InfTNAExpensesMaturityriskrr t ,5,4,3,2,1, log εβββββα ++++++=−  
where the dependent variable is MMMF’s gross return minus risk free rate. The independent variables 
include risk of MMMFs measured as standard deviation of monthly returns, maturity of MMMFs’ 
portfolios measured in days, expense ratios expressed in percentage, the log of total net assets of MMMFs, 
and inflation. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at less than the 10-precent, 5-percent, and 1-percent levels, respectively. 
 
 OLS 
Fund and Year 
Fixed Effects OLS 
Fund and Year 
Fixed Effects 
       
Intercept -0.023 *** -0.002  -0.017 *** -0.0004  
 (-42.63)  (-0.88)  (-38.33)  (-0.22)  
Risk -1.905 *** 2.420 *** -1.520 *** 2.426 *** 
 (-7.02)  (12.31)  (-5.55)  (12.33)  
Maturity 0.00003 *** 0.0000 * 0.00004 *** 0.0000 * 
 (5.50)  (-1.72)  (7.87)  (-1.68)  
Expenses 0.277 *** 0.527 *** 0.113 *** 0.516 *** 
 (9.74)  (13.51)  (4.13)  (13.27)  
LogTNA 0.001 *** 0.0002 ***    
 (19.03)  (3.27)     
Inflation 0.408 *** 0.174 *** 0.404 *** 0.174 *** 
 (33.25)  (13.59)  (32.50)  (13.52)  
         
         
Number of obs. 13,427  13,427  13,427  13,427  
R2 0.11  0.86  0.08  0.86  
Adj R2 0.11    0.08     
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Table 1.6. MMMFs as a Cash Center of a Fund Family 
 
This table reports results from estimating pooled OLS and Family Fixed effects regressions of the family’s 
cash flow volatility on MMMFs’ cash flow volatility and maturity at the family level for the sample of 
2,130 family-years over 1992-2004 period. The estimated coefficients are from regressions of the following 
equations: 
tititi
titititititi
TNAfamTNAmmf
rFamturnoveCFCorCFCorCFVolFamCFVolFamCFVolMMMF
,,6,5
,4,3,,2,1,
loglog
*
εββ
ββββα
++
+++++=  
titititititi
titititititi
vFamvMMFFamMMFCorrFamilyDiveFamilyHICFVolMMMF
TNAfamTNAmmfrFamturnoveCFCorCFVolFamMaturity
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where dependent variables are cash flow volatility and the value weighted average maturity of MMMFs in 
the family. The independent variables include volatility of family’s flows (CFVolFam) and correlation of 
flows between MMMFs and other funds of the family (CFCor), and their interaction term. Other variables 
are family average turnover, the log of MMMFs’ and the rest of the family’s TNA, family Herfindahl index 
(FamilyHI), family diversification variable (FamilyDiver) derived from Fama-French five-factor model, 
correlation between risk of MMMFs and of the rest of the family (FamMMFCor), and the percentage of 
family’s fee revenues from MMMFs (RevMMF/RevFam). T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The 
symbols *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at less than the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent levels, 
respectively. 
 CFVolMMMF  Maturity  
 OLS  Family Fixed OLS  Family Fixed 
       
Intercept -1060.76 *** -1325.629 * -38.67  -3.504  
 (-12.78)  (-1.83)  (-1.08)  (-0.08)  
CFVolFam 0.053 *** 0.035 ** 0.000  -0.0003  
 (3.50)  (2.38)  (-1.23)  (-1.22)  
CFVolFam*CFCor 0.096 *** 0.098 ***    
 (3.44)  (3.68)     
CFCor 86.704 ** 39.554  1.091  1.481 ** 
 (2.00)  (0.90)  (1.29)  (2.05)  
FamTurnover 7.694  12.429  -0.463 * -0.418  
 (0.66)  (0.68)  (-1.87)  (-1.22)  
LogTNAmmf 175.616 *** 133.479 *** 2.352 *** 2.734 *** 
 (13.93)  (4.59)  (5.33)  (4.38)  
LogTNAfam 20.495  42.101  -1.735 *** -1.418 ** 
 (1.37)  (1.24)  (-3.89)  (-2.04)  
CFVolMMMF     0.001  0.001  
     (1.24)  (1.36)  
FamilyHI     -5.626 *** 1.094  
     (-3.04)  (0.46)  
FamilyDiver     86.25 ** 39.720  
     (2.38)  (0.94)  
FamMMFCor     -2.501 ** -2.310 *** 
     (-2.17)  (-2.54)  
RevMMF/RevFam     -1.474  -2.420  
     -0.66  (-0.79)  
         
Number of obs 2,130  2,130  2,100  2,100  
R2 0.23  0.47  0.06  0.53  
Adj R2 0.22    0.05    
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Table 1.7. Determinants of MMMFs’ Expenses 
 
This table reports results from estimating pooled OLS and Fund and Year Fixed effects of the factors 
determining expenses of money market funds at the fund level for 15,283 fund-years over the 1992-2004 
period. The estimated coefficients are from regression of the following equation: 
 
titi
titititi
LogTNAfam
LogTNAMMMFsFamAveExpenseCFVolMMMFExpenses
,,4
,3,2,1,
εβ
βββα
+
++++=
 
Where CFVolMMMF is cash flow volatility of the MMMF and AveExpensesFam is value weighted 
expense ratio of the rest of the MMMF family. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, ** 
and *** indicate statistical significance at less than the 10-precent, 5-percent, and 1-percent levels, 
respectively. 
 
 OLS 
Fund and Year Fixed 
Effects 
     
Intercept 0.0057 *** 0.0048 *** 
 (38.40)  (8.88)  
CFVolMMMF -4.76E-07 *** 0.000  
 (-5.57)  (-0.35)  
AveExpesesFam 0.2817 *** 0.0410 *** 
 (36.90)  (5.31)  
LogTNAMMMF -0.0005 *** -0.0001 *** 
 (-40.79)  (-7.32)  
LogTNAFam 7.29E-06  -0.0000  
 (0.58)  (-1.18)  
     
     
Number of obs 15,283  15,283  
R2 0.20  0.89  
Adj R2 0.20    
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Table 1.8. Effect of Family Loads on the MMMFs’ Characteristics 
 
The table reports results from Family Fixed effects OLS regressions of family average fund loads, 
excluding MMMFs, on the size of MMMFs in the family and cash flow volatility at the family level for the 
sample of 2,151 family-years over the 1992-2004 period. The estimated coefficients are from regressions of 
the following equations:  
titititititi TNAfamdAveBackLoaadAveFrontLoCFCorLIQ ,,4,3,2,1, log εββββα +++++=  
tititi
titititi
LogTNAMMMFTNAfam
dAveBackLoaadAveFrontLoCFCorCFVolMMMF
,,5,4
,3,2,1,
log εββ
βββα
++
++++=
 
where dependent variables are liquidity ratio of the family measured as total net assets of MMMFs relative 
to total net assets of the family and cash flow volatility of MMMFs in the family. Independent variables 
include correlation of flows between MMMFs and other funds of the family (CFCor), value weighted 
average front, back, and total loads of the family and the log of total net assets of the family and of the 
MMMFs. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at less than the 10-precent, 5-percent, and 1-percent levels, respectively. 
 
 LIQ CFVolMMMF 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
       
Intercept 0.7248 *** 0.711 *** -1344.82 * -1324.253 * 
 (5.75)  (5.63)  (-1.85)  (-1.83)  
CFCor 0.008  0.007  103.327 ** 103.848 *** 
 (1.06)  (1.01)  (2.53)  (2.55)  
AveFrontLoad 0.008 **   27.135    
 (2.21)    (1.24)    
AveBackLoad -0.013 *   59.784    
 (-1.88)    (1.47)    
AveTotalLoad   0.004    33.493 * 
   (1.19)    (1.66)  
LogTNAFam -0.017  -0.019 *** 31.189  35.127  
 (-4.20)  (-4.93)  (0.93)  (1.07)  
LogTNAMMMF     136.546 *** 136.127 *** 
     (4.74)  (4.72)  
         
Number of obs 2,151  2,151  2,151  2,151  
R2 0.86  0.86  0.46  0.46  
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Table 1.9. Effect of the Family’s Risk on MMMFs’ Risk and Maturity 
 
The table reports results from estimating pooled OLS and Family Fixed effects regressions of the family 
risk on MMMFs’ risk and maturity at the family level for the sample of 2,130 family-years over the 1992-
2004 period. The estimated coefficients are from regressions of the following equations: 
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where dependent variable is risk of MMMFs’ portfolio of the family. The independent variables include 
family risk measured as standard deviation of monthly value weighted returns of the family’s funds, family 
average turnover, the log of MMMFs’, and the rest of the family’s total net assets (TNA), family 
Herfindahl index (FamilyHI), family diversification variable (FamilyDiver) derived from Fama-French 
five-factor model, correlation between risk of MMMFs and the rest of the family (FamMMFCor), 
percentage of family’s fee revenues from MMMFs (RevMMF/RevFam), and interaction term Family 
risk*FamMMFCor. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at less than the 10-precent, 5-percent, and 1-percent levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable: MMMF risk 
 Model 1  Model 2  
 OLS  Family fixed OLS  Family fixed 
     
Intercept 0.0003 *** 0.0005  -0.003 *** -0.004 ***
 (10.13)  (1.46)  (-3.67)  (-3.13)  
Family risk 0.0025 *** 0.0040 *** 0.004 *** 0.006 ***
 (7.62)  (8.72)  (4.52)  (5.47)  
FamTurnover 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
 (-0.46)  (0.12)  (-0.34)  (0.38)  
LogTNAMMF 0.0000  0.0000  -0.00002 *** 0.0000  
 (-0.36)  (0.40)  (-2.48)  (-0.57)  
LogTNAFam 0.0000  -0.00003 ** 0.00001  0.00004 ** 
 (-0.42)  (-2.61)  (1.28)  (-2.08)  
FamilyHI     0.0000  -0.0001  
     (-0.19)  (-1.31)  
FamilyDiver     0.0035 *** 0.005 ***
     (3.94)  (3.60)  
FamMMFCor     0.00004 * 0.00005 ** 
     (1.84)  (1.95)  
RevMMF/RevFam     0.0002 ** 0.0001  
     (2.48)  (1.18)  
Family risk* 
FamMMFCor     -0.003  -0.005  
     (-0.28)  (-0.41)  
         
Number of obs 2,130  2,130  2,100  2,100  
R2 0.03  0.13  0.04  0.14  
Adj R2 0.03    0.04    
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Table 9 Continued 
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where dependent variable is value weighted average maturity of money market funds in the family. The 
independent variables include family risk measured as standard deviation of monthly value weighted 
returns of the family’s funds, family average turnover, the log of MMMFs’ and the rest of the family’s total 
net assets (TNA), family Herfindahl index (FamilyHI), family diversification variable (FamilyDiver) 
derived from Fama-French five-factor model, correlation between risk of MMMFs and the rest of the 
family (FamMMFCor), percentage of the family’s fee revenues from MMMFs (RevMMF/RevFam), and 
interaction term Family risk*FamMMFCor. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and 
*** indicate statistical significance at less than the 10-precent, 5-percent, and 1-percent levels, respectively. 
 
Panel B: Dependent variable: Maturity 
 Model 1  Model 2  
 OLS  Family fixed OLS  Family fixed 
     
Intercept 38.9843 *** 31.3511 ** -16.307  51.285  
 (24.90)  (2.48)  (-0.35)  (0.93)  
Family risk -31.2290 * -13.8307  100.27 ** 35.832  
 (-1.72)  (-0.74)  (2.02)  (0.76)  
FamTurnover -0.5273 ** -0.4353  -0.424 * -0.414  
 (-2.19)  (-1.35)  (-1.71)  (-1.21)  
LogTNAMMF 1.8208 *** 1.9848 *** 2.608 *** 2.632 ***
 (9.37)  (4.92)  (5.90)  (4.37)  
LogTNAFam -0.6503 *** -0.4364  -2.038 *** -1.102  
 (-3.17)  (-1.05)  (-4.50)  (-1.57)  
FamilyHI     -6.375 *** 0.826  
     (-3.41)  (0.34)  
FamilyDiver    63.41  -17.698  
    (1.33)  (-0.33)  
FamMMFCor    -2.508 ** -2.511 ***
    (-2.13)  (-2.64)  
RevMMF/RevFam     -7.104 ** -4.955  
     (-2.19)  (-1.18)  
Family risk* 
FamMMFCor     -1227.5 ** -700.2  
     (-2.29)  (-1.46)  
         
Number of obs 2,128  2,128  2,100  2,100  
R2 0.05  0.53  0.06  0.53  
Adj R2 0.04    0.06    
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Table 1.10. Effect of the Family Fund Investment Objectives on the Number and 
Investment Objectives of MMMFs 
 
The table reports results from estimating Family Fixed Effect OLS, and Family Fixed Effect Poisson 
regressions of family investment objectives on the number of MMMFs in the family and their investment 
objectives for the sample of 2,152 family-years over the 1992-2004 period. The estimated coefficients are 
from regressions of the following equations: 
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where dependent variables are number of MMMFs offered by the family – MMMFNum, number of 
investment objectives of MMMFs offered by the family - MMMFObjNum, and Herfindahl index of 
MMMFs in the family –  MMMFHI. The independent variables include number of family investment 
objectives besides MMMFs (FamObjNum), number of funds in the family, excluding MMMFs, 
(FamFundNum), value weighted average of front and back loads in the family, and the log of total net 
assets of MMMFs and the family. T-statistics for OLS and z-statistics for Poisson are reported in 
parentheses. Poisson regression reports Pseudo R2. The symbols *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at less than the 10-precent, 5-percent, and 1-percent levels, respectively. 
 
 MMMFNum MMMFObjNum MMMFHI 
 OLS  Poisson  OLS  Poisson  OLS  
           
Intercept -7.695 *   0.437    0.473 ***
 (-1.91)    (1.18)    3.95  
FamObjNum -0.192 *** 0.011 * 0.013 *** 0.008  -0.040 ***
 (-3.33)  (1.86)  (2.54)  (0.77)  -23.23  
FamFundNum 0.101 *** 0.003 *** 0.001 *** 0.000  0.000 ** 
 (19.61)  (8.22)  (2.47)  (0.11)  2.13  
AveFrontLoad 0.213 * 0.007  0.056 *** 0.025  0.007 * 
 (1.78)  (0.51)  (5.11)  (1.14)  1.78  
AveBackLoad -0.345  -0.051 * -0.014  -0.014  0.009  
 (-1.55)  (-1.87)  (-0.70)  (-0.33)  1.30  
LogTNAMMMF 1.715 *** 0.340 *** 0.280 *** 0.160 *** -0.003  
 (10.83)  (13.48)  (19.32)  (4.73)  -0.56  
LogTNAFam -0.266  0.003  -0.091 *** -0.064  -0.001  
 (-1.30)  (0.10)  (-4.86)  (-1.47)  -0.14  
           
Number of 
obs 2,151  2,126  2,151  2,126  2129  
R2 0.90    0.88    0.80  
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ESSAY TWO 
 
INNOVATIONS IN FINANCIAL PRODUCTS: CONVENTIONAL MUTUAL FUNDS 
VERSUS EXCHANGE TRADED FUNDS 
 
1. Introduction 
Innovations in financial markets are important for market development. A 
relatively recent example of innovation comes from the mutual fund industry, with the 
introduction of exchange traded funds (ETF). These ETFs offer a claim on the same 
underlying assets as those of conventional open-end mutual index funds, but have an 
organizational form different from that of conventional mutual funds and, accordingly, 
have different features and outcomes for investors. Some other examples of competing 
innovations are money market accounts offered by both mutual funds and banks, and 
futures contracts with the same underlying assets and/or trading on different exchanges. 
All of these innovations were created to capture some part of the competitive market, and 
though they are costly to develop, they are beneficial to investors, as they add to the 
completeness of the market through increased liquidity, ease of trade, possibilities for 
hedging and arbitrage, and additional services.  
Not all innovations have been successful. For example, some studies show that 
the introduction of redundant contracts in futures markets have failed to attract enough 
market share to survive (Duffie and Jackson (1989), Johnston and McConnell (1989), 
Silber (1981)). Successful innovations also should be studied to provide grounds for other 
innovations. Not many empirical studies exist on financial innovations, as was pointed 
out by Frame and White (2002), and those that exist are clustered around very few 
products. The main reason for this, as the authors suggest, is unavailability of data. This 
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paper uses a broad sample of indexes to study the ETF as an innovation in organizational 
form and asset characteristics that compete with existing open-end index mutual funds.  
Mutual funds have existed for almost seven decades and offer a wide range of 
products and benefits to their investors. Index funds represent about $1.5 trillion of 
mutual fund industry assets. However, a decade ago, a new fund type, the ETF, was 
introduced. This product became very popular, especially in the last several years, 
suggesting that there was a room for improvement on the existing index products. If 
ETFs are more efficient, then they should gradually replace conventional index mutual 
funds. However, this has not yet happened in reality. Observations show that, even 
though the products seem to be the same: a return that tracks an index, the outcomes of 
investing through a conventional index fund versus an ETF can be different based on 
investor-specific circumstances. This study addresses whether conventional mutual funds 
and ETFs are substitutes, and how their coexistence in the market can be explained. 
The main differences between conventional index funds and ETFs are associated 
with the trading options of fund shares for individual investors, and fee and tax 
implications created with those options. ETFs have lower fund level fees due to the 
elimination of individual investor accounting by ETFs, as this function is shifted to 
brokers. Also, ETFs are perceived to be more tax efficient, as their organizational 
structure allows them to efficiently minimize capital gain distributions. Data analysis 
shows that, on average, ETFs have smaller tracking errors and are more efficient after 
expenses.  
The results of the study demonstrate that conventional and exchange traded index 
funds are substitutes, showing that if ETFs are more efficient in terms of performance, 
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then, aggregated by index, one dollar of the flows of ETFs will take about 22 cents of 
regular funds’ flows. However, though the fund level fees of ETFs are lower than those 
of conventional funds, brokerage fees and commissions that investors have to pay for 
trading ETF shares may increase total investor expenses in certain conditions. The 
coexistence of two types of index funds can be explained by a clientele effect, which puts 
the two types in different market niches. A test of clientele reveals that ETFs and regular 
funds are not perfect substitutes, and each is preferred by a different type of investor. 
Specifically, the results show evidence of a tax clientele, suggesting that ETFs are chosen 
by tax sensitive investors, while conventional funds may be preferred by tax exempt or 
insensitive investors who value services of mutual funds. A test for institutional clientele 
did not reveal a significant difference between the reactions of institutional and retail 
investors to the availability of ETFs.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature 
review. Section 3 compares index mutual fund and exchange traded fund investments, 
examines the reasons behind investors’ choices between a conventional fund and an ETF, 
fund type substitutability, and performance differences and characteristics. Data and 
empirical analysis are given in Sections 4 and 5, respectively, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
 An extensive pool of literature exists on conventional mutual funds, covering 
different aspects of the mutual fund industry, such as performance, management, and 
fund structure (e.g., Sirri and Tufano (1998), Edelen (1999), Elton et al (1993), and 
Carhart (1997) among many others.). However, very few studies are available on ETFs, 
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including those that compare conventional mutual funds with ETFs. The main reason for 
this is the short time period for which ETFs have existed, and the lack of availability of 
related data. Conventional mutual funds were created in the 1940s and increased in 
popularity in the 1970s. The fist ETF was created in 1993, though awareness and active 
use by investors have increased in recent years.  
The mutual fund literature on index funds, specifically, the research that looks at 
performance, costs, and tracking errors, is relevant to this paper for analysis of both 
conventional and exchange traded index funds. The main question raised in the literature 
is about the tradeoff between enhanced returns and the tracking error of index funds. It is 
widely known that stocks added or removed from the S&P 500 index experience 
abnormal returns on announcement. Index fund managers could trade on the date of 
announcement instead of the actual change date and enhance the return of the fund. 
However, that would increase the tracking error, and to achieve the low tracking errors 
observed in practice, an indexer must closely follow the exact replication strategy. Blume 
and Edelen (2003, 2004) show that a strategy for S&P 500 indexers of trading at the open 
following the announcement of a change, rather than at the change, adds 19.2 basis points 
to the return per year with almost no added risk, but with substantial increase in the 
tracking error. Blume and Edelen (2003, 2004) argue that this additional return is a 
measure of the delegation cost in monitoring an indexer through a tracking error, and 
show that less than half of the studied indexers always follow the exact replication 
strategy, consistent with the hypothesis that these indexers are trying to recoup some of 
these delegation costs. 
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Gastineau (2004) addresses a similar issue relative to ETFs, examining the 
performance of index ETFs relative to the benchmark and conventional index funds. 
Instead of focusing on the tax efficiency of the ETF structure, Gastineau (2004) looks at 
the operating efficiency of index funds. By employing the strategy discussed in Blume 
and Edelen (2003, 2004), Gastineau (2004) shows that conventional index funds 
outperform by making transactions at some time other than the market close on the last 
day of formal index rebalancing. Gastineau argues that a structural weakness in current 
ETFs is a part of the explanation for their underperformance, and argues that a change in 
portfolio management policy will permit ETFs to perform in line with conventional funds 
on a pre-tax basis and, presumably, outperform them on an after-tax basis in the long run 
due to tax-efficiency of the ETF structure. Elton et al. (2002) also investigate the 
performance of ETFs relative to the underlying index benchmark. Specifically, they 
examine the characteristics and performance of SPDR (Spiders) ETF and find that its net 
asset value is kept close to market price by its ability to create and delete shares by in-
kind transactions. The results of the paper show that SPDR underperforms the S&P 500 
Index by 28 basis points and low-cost index funds by 18 points. Elton et al.’s (2002) 
explanation is the lost income caused by holding dividends received on the underlying 
shares in cash.  
However, in spite of the documented performance disadvantage, the ETF is still 
considered to be an important instrument because of its organizational form. ETFs are 
widely discussed as a prototype for the mutual funds of the future. ETFs seem to offer the 
benefits of both open-end and closed-end funds. In particular, they trade close to net asset 
value (NAV), and, like closed-end funds, they offer the ability to transact at the market 
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price at any point during the trading day. ETFs avoid the disadvantages of closed-end 
funds for which prices may deviate widely from NAV, and the disadvantages of open-end 
funds that are priced only once a day, and, in addition, often have restrictions or 
minimum limits on sales and purchases by customers.  
Most of the studies, including those mentioned above, are based on a limited 
sample of funds, and the results are representative only of big funds that have a 
significant share and presence in the market. That is justifiable and valuable, but a 
broader study on more comprehensive data is necessary to make more accurate 
conclusions. One of the goals of this paper is to conduct such a study.  
Another aspect that has been examined in the literature is the impact of capital 
gains taxes on after-tax returns for shareholders of conventional index mutual funds. 
Interestingly, the majority of these studies were conducted before ETFs were introduced 
to the market. Mutual funds are organized in such a way that they pass through all capital 
gains to the investors. The problem of capital gains realization within mutual funds due to 
the rebalancing of existing portfolios and the tax implications on shareholders is widely 
recognized by both academics and practitioners. One way to deal with this problem is to 
implement a special trading strategy that would offset realized capital gains. Dickson and 
Shoven (1994) examine the feasibility of managing open-end and closed-end S&P 500 
index funds in order to defer net capital gains realization. They show that it is possible to 
incorporate certain features of the U.S. tax laws, i.e., wash-sale rules and the offsetting of 
short-term and long-term capital gains and losses, for potential improvements in post-tax 
returns to the investors engaged in tax minimization strategies. However, active 
management of index funds would deviate from funds objectives and impose the problem 
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of increased tracking error, i.e. there is a tradeoff between reduced capital gains and 
increased tracking error. 
The introduction of ETFs to the market alleviated the problem of managing 
capital gains realization. Poterba and Shoven (2002) examine the perception of ETFs 
being more tax efficient than traditional equity mutual funds by comparing the pre-tax 
and after-tax returns on the largest ETF, the SPDR trust, with returns on the largest equity 
fund, the Vanguard Index 500 fund. The results suggest that, between 1994 and 2000, 
both the before- and after-tax returns on the SPDR and Vanguard Index 500 fund were 
very similar. The argument for tax efficiency is that by reducing the tax burden on 
investments in corporate stocks through ETFs relative to investments in the same stocks 
through equity mutual funds, ETFs may move closer to the consumption-tax treatment of 
corporate capital income. Plancich (2003) looks at mutual fund capital gains distributions 
and the tax reform act of 1997, which made long-term capital gains less taxable, and 
finds that managers appear to tilt their distributions towards the long-term after 1997. The 
reason for them to do so is to make their returns more attractive after-tax and to attract 
more cash flows. This implies that investors are tax sensitive and prefer higher after-tax 
returns on their investments.  
However, no existing study, to my knowledge, examines how the characteristics 
of exchange traded and conventional mutual funds define their roles in the market, or 
addresses the prospects of their coexistence and future development. If these two kinds of 
index instruments coexist in the long term, despite their similarities, their intricate 
differences in characteristics and their implications should explain this coexistence. For 
example, some of the reasons for using ETFs as opposed to conventional index funds can 
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be (i) tax efficiency and (ii) investors’ need for immediacy and trading options, which 
can be used for controlling risk and short-term trading. A reason why both ETFs and 
conventional index funds are found in the marketplace can be, for example, the result of a 
clientele effect. The low rate of taxable distributions on ETFs may make them more 
attractive to equity investments outside of tax-deferred accounts, such as IRAs or 
401(k)s. At the same time, some attributes of traditional equity mutual funds may make 
regular funds more attractive for retirement account investors. Also, ETFs may be a part 
of an emerging trend toward segmentation of the mutual fund marketplace, with frequent 
traders segregated into products different from those preferred by low-turnover investors.  
The challenge of constructing empirical tests of the clientele effect and market 
segregation is caused by the poor availability of data on individual investor trades. 
Kostovetsky (2003) compares two methods of passive investment using a model that is 
helpful in examining major differences between ETFs and index funds.  This model is 
based on investor trading preferences, tax implications, and other characteristics. 
Kostovetsky (2003) shows that the key areas of differences between the two instruments 
are management fees, taxation efficiency, and other qualitative differences. I take these 
differences into account in my empirical tests. 
The intended contribution of this paper is to conduct a thorough comparative 
study of the performance, cost, and efficiency of ETFs and index funds using a more 
comprehensive data set, and to test for substitution and clientele effects.  
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3. Comparison of conventional and exchange traded index funds 
3.1 History of ETFs 
 The period of introduction of ETFs to the market corresponds to the period of 
research related to problems associated with non-tradability and the organizational 
structure of conventional mutual funds.22 Before ETFs of modern form where developed, 
some pioneer forms came to the market. As described by Gastineau (2001, 2002), the 
history of ETFs starts with Index Participation Shares (IPS), which tracked the S&P 500 
index and were first traded in 1989. The IPS was followed by Toronto Stock Exchange 
Index Participations (TIPs) and Supershares. The first ETF to start trading on Amex in 
1993 was Standard & Poor’s Depository Receipts (SPDRs), with a structure of a unit 
trust. Later, other exchange-traded index products were developed with a structure 
similar to mutual funds as opposed to unit trusts. One of the earliest of this type is World 
Equity Benchmark Shares (WEBS) – now iShares MSCI Series. Currently, as of 
September 2005, about 180 ETFs are available to investors (Investment Company 
Institute (ICI) report and etfconnect.com). The funds are offered by ten different sponsor 
companies and provide a large variety of domestic and international underlying indexes 
and assets.  
 
3.2 Conceptual differences between ETFs and conventional open-end index funds 
The first and the most important difference between ETFs and conventional open-
end index funds is that ETFs are traded in the secondary market at the price prevailing at 
that moment, and not at NAV. ETFs can be purchased or sold at any time during a 
                                                 
22 For example, research on capital gains realization and taxation of mutual funds (Dickson and Shoven 
(1994), and Bluoin et al (2000)). 
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trading day unlike conventional mutual funds, the shares of which can be exchanged 
directly with the funds only at the 4 pm NAV as determined by the funds. This option of 
intraday trading may not necessarily be valuable to every investor; however, it may 
appeal to investors who are concerned about the ability to get out of a position before the 
market is closed when prices are volatile.  
Primary market transactions in ETFs consist of in-kind creations and redemptions 
in large sizes. This is another important characteristic of the organizational structure of 
ETFs that distinguishes them from conventional funds. The ability to trade like stocks in 
the secondary market makes ETFs similar to closed-end mutual funds, but the feature of 
in-kind creations and redemptions makes ETFs very distinct from all other types of 
managed portfolios. This also allows ETF managers to deal with the problem of 
premiums and discounts due to divergence between price and NAV. The possibility of 
intraday creations or redemptions is a significant factor in maintaining ETF prices 
extremely close to NAV.  
Also, redemption-in-kind can improve the tax efficiency of ETFs, which is 
important for the majority of investors. In contrast, most redemptions of conventional 
funds are for cash, and, in the case of significant fund holder redemptions, a fund is 
required to sell shares of the portfolio that may have appreciated from their original 
cost.23 This procedure can realize capital gains, which have to be distributed to all 
shareholders, and even continuing investors have to pay taxes on these distributions. 
ETFs, however, take advantage of a special tax treatment through redemption-in-kind, 
thus improving their tax efficiency. In such a scenario, the low cost basis shares of each 
                                                 
23 Redemption-in-kind in conventional funds is allowed on large amounts with a minimum of $250,000; 
however, funds are reluctant to do so. In addition, the majority of investors have positions smaller than the 
specified minimum. 
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stock in an ETF’s portfolio are delivered against redemption requests. Conventional 
funds, in contrast, try to sell their highest cost basis stocks first, leaving the cost basis of 
the portfolios low and, therefore, making funds subject to higher capital gains later, e.g. 
in case a particular stock leaves the index and the portfolio needs rebalancing. With ETF 
in-kind redemptions, a fund portfolio has a relatively higher cost basis, which means that 
acquired stocks generate smaller gains when they leave the index. There are two types of 
capital gain tax liabilities: when investors sell fund shares (controlled by the investors), 
and for funds’ activities independent of investor trading (not controlled by the investors). 
ETFs create tax efficiency for the latter type, making ETFs more attractive for tax 
sensitive investors.  
Since ETFs are traded just like any stock, ETFs and conventional funds also differ 
in distribution channels, which is another important factor. The shares of an ETF must be 
purchased through brokerage firms, which entail commission costs, such as brokerage 
fees and a bid-ask spread. In contrast, conventional fund’s shares can be purchased 
directly from the fund. Therefore, shareholder accounting for ETFs takes place at 
brokerage firms rather than at the funds. Elimination of the individual shareholder 
transfer agency function reduces operating costs.24 The expenses of ETFs tend to reflect 
the cost savings on this function (see data description in Table 3). However, even if 
operating costs are reduced, an individual investor may face different marginal costs 
when investing through ETFs due to brokerage fees, commissions, and bid-ask spreads. 
Thus, depending on the investor’s trading activity and the volume of trade, the costs and, 
                                                 
24 One of the traditional functions of the mutual fund transfer agent is to keep records of fund position 
placements, so that ongoing payments based on 12b-1 fees or other marketing charges can be allocated to 
the appropriate persons.  
 67
therefore, preferences of investing through an ETF versus a conventional fund can differ 
among types of investors.  
In addition, ETFs can be purchased on margin and sold short, and some ETFs 
have traded options, which are not available for conventional mutual funds. These 
features can be important for investors who perform risk management, and may be 
especially useful for institutional investors who are looking to hedge large-sized 
contracts. In this case, ETFs are attractive because they have a large variety in tracked 
indexes, and, unlike futures contracts, they do not expire. 
On the other hand, ETFs and conventional index funds have many similarities. 
Both have operating expenses, which reduce investors’ returns. Most ETFs to date have 
been designed to track a specific market index, similar to the way conventional index 
funds do. Both ETFs and conventional index funds may experience tracking errors in 
matching pre-tax returns on their tracked indexes (Blume and Edelen (2003, 2004), 
Gastineau (2004), Elton et al (2002)). 
However, even though ETFs and conventional index funds offer similar products, 
the differences listed above suggest that they may be preferred by different types of 
investors. ETFs may be preferred by intraday investors who demand short-term liquidity 
or immediacy in trade, by long-term investors who buy in large amounts and seek lower 
management fees, by hedgers and speculators because of options traded on ETFs that 
allow for minimizing exposure or maximizing profits through leverage, and by investors 
who are tax sensitive due to the tax-efficiency of ETFs. On the other hand, conventional 
index funds would be preferred by active investors who make many small purchases or 
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sales due to no commission costs, by those who place less value on liquidity or 
immediacy in trade, and by those who are tax exempt or less tax sensitive. 
 
3.3 Hypotheses formulation 
 What motivates index investors to choose either a conventional mutual fund or an 
ETF? These funds provide the same product in that they earn a return on some market 
index, but have differences in operation that can be advantageous for certain types of 
investors.  
 Based on the predictions of economic theory, substitutes, complements, and 
independent products have different quantity reactions to price changes of other products. 
Fund fees, returns, and tracking errors are notable determinants of investors’ demand. 
Depending on the cross product relationship between conventional index funds and ETFs, 
investors would react differently to relative variances in fee changes in conventional 
index funds and ETFs. If these two fund types are indeed good substitutes, then due to the 
fee and trading advantages of ETFs, conventional index funds would be expected to 
gradually disappear or lose a significant share of the market. We do observe ETFs 
gaining market share. However, the loss in the market share of conventional index funds 
appears to be due to fund industry growth, including growth in ETFs, but not due to the 
outflow of assets from conventional index funds (Fig. 1 and 2). Thus, even if they are 
substitutes, this effect of a negative flow relationship between the fund types may be 
diminished or emphasized by competitive actions that the funds may take.  
Conventional index funds facing competition from ETFs are pressured to make 
adjustments in operations to match the level of fees to that of ETFs. For example, Fidelity 
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reduced fees in October 2004. This was followed by other funds (Economist, September 
2004). For ETF investors, lower costs at the fund level may not necessarily translate into 
lower costs at the investor level due to brokerage fees, commissions, and bid-ask spreads, 
which may differ on an individual basis.25  
Non-price competition, on the other hand, as reflected in different organizational 
structures and services provided, may diminish the substitution effect by segregating 
investors into different niches. In this case, ETFs would not be expected to completely 
drive conventional index funds out of the market. 
 
3.3.1 Substitution effect 
The analysis starts with examining whether conventional index funds and ETFs 
are substitutes, and what implications this may have for development of the industry. 
Based on the similarities of the underlying products, these two types of index investment 
are expected to be substitutes, which should be reflected in fund flow relations. 
Hypothesis 1:  If conventional mutual open-end index funds and ETFs are substitutes, 
then they will have a negative fund flow relation. 
 If the two products are substitutes, then demand for these products and the level 
of the substitution relation will be determined by their prices. In the fund industry, 
demand can be measured by assets allocated or fund flows, and the price can be measured 
by fund fees or returns adjusted for fees. Thus, in price competition, funds may either 
reduce fees or enhance their performance through returns. However, for index funds, an 
additional measure of performance is a tracking error. Therefore, two main criteria for 
                                                 
25 Therefore, in addition to comparing performance net of fund fees, it is important to look at the investor 
level account performance net of all fees. 
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exchange traded and conventional index funds’ evaluation are the size of the tracking 
error and total fees. The funds with smaller value of both of these criteria will generally 
be able to attract more of investors’ money. The organizational structure implies, and 
data indicate, that ETFs have lower fees. A detailed analysis of the tracking error and fees 
is available in a later section of this paper. 
 Besides the differences in prices, the two fund types differ in organizational 
structure, trading, and tax implications. ETFs have some non-price advantages, which can 
enhance the substitution effect. However, if different investors value these benefits 
differently, it can also reduce the substitution effect, leading to a clientele effect, which 
may explain why conventional index funds and ETFs can coexist in the longer term. 
 
3.3.2 Clientele effect 
 One of the advantages that ETFs have with their organizational structure is tax 
efficiency. As ETFs can realize fewer capital gains, they impose less tax on individual 
investors. Other things being equal, ETFs should generally be preferred to conventional 
funds by tax sensitive investors. Another advantage of ETFs is intraday trading at the 
prevailing price rather than at stale NAV and additional trading options like short selling, 
margins, and, sometimes, derivatives. Therefore, ETFs should generally be preferred to 
conventional funds by intraday active traders, hedgers, and speculators, because ETFs 
give more flexibility in trading and provide more options for risk management. However, 
these trading options of ETFs do not come free: They involve brokerage fees and 
commissions, which may increase total expenses for investors.  This presents a tradeoff 
between the added benefits of the structure of ETFs and additional costs related to those 
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benefits. Various investors may have different break-even points, and, therefore, the 
choices of fund types (regular or ETF) may be different. Thus, coexistence of 
conventional and exchange traded index funds may be explained by the clientele effect. 
Hypothesis 2: ETFs are preferred by investors with higher liquidity and trading needs 
and/or higher marginal taxes.  
 This segregation of investors is partially due to the existence of brokerage fees on 
ETF transactions for individual investors. An important criterion that investors consider 
for their asset allocation is the cost associated with the investments. If an investor has to 
make many small purchases, then the total cost of the investment may be high, even if 
ETFs’ fund level fees are generally lower than fees of similar conventional funds. For the 
long-term investor who plans to make one large lump-sum investment, an ETF may be a 
good choice, as ETFs’ annual fees are on average lower than those of regular funds. This 
may be a clientele effect based on investors’ time horizon: Long-term investors prefer 
ETFs due to lower management fees, and short-term active investors prefer mutual funds 
due to no commission costs. 
Another criterion that investors take into account is the tax consequence of the 
investment. ETFs are generally expected to be more tax efficient than regular index funds 
due to their organizational structure. Retirement accounts are either tax exempt or tax 
deferred, and, therefore, investors in those accounts may not gain additional value in 
ETFs’ tax efficiency.  Also, institutional investors may not necessarily be very tax 
sensitive, because they pass through their tax liability to individual investors.26 This is tax 
clientele, and investors’ choices between ETFs and conventional index funds are 
                                                 
26 Though, if an individual investor, a final tax-payer, is tax sensitive, then institutional funds will tend to 
be more tax sensitive to attract more flows. 
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expected to be as follows. Tax sensitive investors would generally prefer ETFs, while tax 
insensitive investors would prefer conventional index funds for the additional services 
provided. 
The next criterion that some investors value in ETFs is the availability of trading 
options. Investors more sensitive to volatility, such as hedgers, speculators, and intraday 
traders, would generally prefer ETFs. The majority of individual investors do not 
represent this group of investors. Institutional investors, however, can take advantage of 
intraday pricing and trading options, and are expected to prefer ETFs.  This leads to 
institutional clientele. 
 Supporting arguments for the above statement follow. The dollar value of a 
transaction for an institutional investor is usually high, which reduces brokerage fees as a 
proportion to the invested amount. In contrast, retail investors’ transactions are smaller. 
In addition to the common benefits that ETFs offer to institutional and retail investors, 
institutional investors may better benefit from the wide array of risk management and 
investment strategies, such as equitizing cash, managing cash flows, equity/fixed income 
asset allocation, sector/country exposure, hedge strategies, relative value and long/short 
strategies, and transitions.  
 As ETFs are expected to be more suitable for institutional investors if ETFs and 
conventional funds are substitutes (Hypothesis 1), then the substitution effect between 
institutional index funds and ETFs should be larger than the substitution effect between 
retail index funds and ETFs.  
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4. Data sources and descriptive statistics 
 Several data sources are used for the analysis. The aggregate data from ICI are 
used for analysis of industry trends, and are presented in Table 1 and illustrated by Fig. 1. 
Overall, from 1993 to 2004, assets of equity mutual funds grew substantially, indicating 
an increase in investors’ interest in this type of investment. During 2000-2003, equity 
mutual fund assets decreased; however, ETFs showed steady growth during the same 
period of time. Between 1993, the year the first ETF was introduced, and 2004, assets 
held by equity mutual funds increased almost six times. Over the same period, ETFs grew 
from almost no assets to 5% of assets in equity mutual funds.  Fig. 2 (obtained from 
Economist print edition Sep 23rd 2004) shows the market shares of conventional index 
funds and ETFs for the 1996-2004 time period. The figure indicates that the share of 
conventional index funds remained almost unchanged from 1999 to 2004, staying at 
around 8%, and the share of ETFs increased significantly to about 5% in 2004.  
 The primary source of the fund level data for both conventional index funds and 
ETFs is the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) survivor-bias free US mutual 
fund database. The complete data set on ETFs is only available for the years after 2000. 
Thus, I restrict the study period to range between 2000 and 2004. 
 The study is done by matching ETFs with conventional index funds tracking the 
same indexes. The conventional index fund list is obtained from www.indexfunds.com, 
and the ETF list is collected from www.etfconnect.com.27 From a universe of 180 ETFs 
and 369 conventional index funds, nine indexes tracked by both types of funds were 
identified, giving a sample of 171 conventional index funds and 11 ETFs (see Appendix).   
                                                 
27 Wharton Research Data Services refers to the same source used by researchers to identify index funds. 
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 The mutual fund industry aggregate data come from the ICI website. Index return 
data are collected from index providers. The sample is an uneven panel of monthly fund 
data aggregated by tracked indexes between 2000 and 2004. The number of funds per 
time period may differ due to the introduction of new funds.  
 Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of ETFs and conventional index funds, 
separated into institutional and retail funds, and grouped by index, during the 2000-2004 
time period. The statistics indicate that more retail than institutional funds exist within 
each index group, and each group has more conventional funds than ETFs. Retail funds 
are, on average, larger than institutional funds within an index group. ETFs are, on 
average, larger than conventional funds for six out of nine indexes. Expense ratios are the 
lowest for ETFs. Conventional institutional funds are substantially cheaper than retail 
funds. For most of the indexes, ETFs did not have capital gains distributions. 
Conventional index funds had capital gains distributions averaging around $0.2 million 
per year. On average, flows to ETFs were positive and substantially higher than those to 
conventional index funds. Retail funds experienced negative average flows for several 
indexes during the study period.  
 
5. Empirical analysis 
5.1 Performance 
 Before testing the main hypotheses, the performances of ETFs and conventional 
index funds are studied. Due to variations in organizational structure, a source of 
performance differences would come from differences in the ability to react to index 
change announcements and related tracking error effects (Blume and Edelen (2004), and 
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Gastineau (2004) among others). Performance differences also come from fund expenses, 
measured by expense ratios. ETFs are expected to have lower expense ratios due to their 
exemption from individual account bookkeeping.  
Recent developments in the mutual funds industry show that price competition 
exists not only among conventional funds but also between conventional funds and ETFs. 
For example, in October 2004, the Fidelity fund family reduced fees on its five main 
equity index funds to a tenth of a cent per dollar invested (Economist, September 2004). 
Other funds follow similar strategies to effectively compete against comparable ETFs. 
These adjustments in fees may be another indicator that conventional index funds and 
ETFs are, indeed, substitutes, and that facing an increase in competition due to the 
introduction of ETFs, conventional mutual funds search for new ways to attract investors.  
 Performance tests are done by conducting univariate analyses of effectiveness and 
the tracking error of regular index funds and ETFs. Effectiveness is measured as the 
difference between fund return and tracked index return. Tracking error is an absolute 
value of the effectiveness variable. Means are calculated in each index group of funds, 
and the means of the two groups are compared. Table 2 presents the results of the 
univariate analyses of effectiveness and tracking error. Panel A shows the statistics for 
the differences between gross fund returns and index returns and for absolute values of 
the differences. The means of these variables are calculated as the averages across the 
funds that track one of the nine studied indexes. Then, t-statistics are calculated to test 
whether the means are statistically different from zero. Further, a difference in means 
between conventional index funds and ETFs is calculated for each index and tested for 
statistical significance. For five out of the nine indexes, conventional funds have positive 
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means of effectiveness that are significantly different from zero, while ETFs show this 
result for only one index. For two indexes, Russell 2000 and S&P 500, the means of 
effectiveness are statistically different for conventional funds and ETFs, indicating that 
conventional funds have higher effectiveness in gross returns. The absolute value of 
effectiveness, i.e. tracking error of gross returns, is statistically different from zero at less 
than the 1-percent level for fund types and for all indexes. The difference in tracking 
error between conventional funds and ETFs is positive and statistically significant at less 
than the 1-percent level for all but Dow Jones Industrial indexes, indicating that ETFs 
generally track underlying indexes with gross returns better than conventional funds. 
 Panel B presents similar statistics for net returns. On average, conventional funds 
underperformed four and outperformed one out of nine indexes, with statistical 
significance at less than the 5-percent level. ETFs, on average, underperformed six and 
outperformed one out of nine indexes with statistical significance at less than the 1-
percent level. However, differences in the means between groups of funds indicate that 
the magnitude of underperformance is smaller for ETFs for three indexes at less than the 
10-pecent level. The means for the other indexes are not statistically different from each 
other. The tracking error of net returns is statistically different from zero for both fund 
types and for all nine indexes at less than the 1-percent level. The differences in means 
indicate that ETFs have smaller net tracking error for eight out of nine indexes at less 
than the 1-percent level.  
 Conventional funds and ETFs have noticeable differences in sample size. To 
control for this, first, the averages of net returns across funds are calculated for each 
index, and index returns are then subtracted, giving the effectiveness measure. Panel C 
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presents the results for this measure. On average, conventional funds underperformed 
three and outperformed one out of nine indexes with statistical significance at less than 
the 10-percent level. ETFs, on average, underperformed six and outperformed one out of 
nine indexes with statistical significance at less than the 1-percent level. However, the 
mean difference of effectiveness between regular funds and ETFs was statistically 
significant at less than the 5-percent level only for one index, and this was in favor of 
ETFs. Results for tracking error are the same as reported in Panel B. 
 Thus, it may be concluded that on average, ETFs have smaller tracking errors and 
are more effective in returns after fees.  
 
5.2 Substitution effect 
 The best way to test for the substitution effect between index funds and ETFs is to 
look at the individual investor level choices by following trades in personal investment 
accounts. As conventional index funds and ETFs buy similar underlying products, we 
would expect that both enter an investor’s utility function. However, data at the 
individual investor level are not available. To overcome this problem, all investors in the 
economy are looked at in aggregate and considered as a single representative investor. 
Therefore, aggregate flows to conventional index funds and ETFs are used as the 
indicator of the representative investor choice, and the substitution effect between funds 
is tested with the following model of a system of equations.  
i,ti,t9i,t8i,t7i,t6i,t5
i,t4i,t3i,t2i,t1i,ti,t
εLogTNAβExpensesβlagRetβRetβtlagIndexReβ
ryFlowIndustβlagFlowETFβlagFlowRFβFlowETFβαFlowRF
+++++
+++++=
  (1) 
i,ti,t9i,t8i,t7i,t6i,t5
i,t4i,t3i,t2i,t1i,ti,t
εLogTNAβExpensesβlagRetβRetβtlagIndexReβ
ryFlowIndustβlagFlowETFβlagFlowRFβFlowRFβαFlowETF
+++++
+++++=
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where dependent variables are flows to regular funds (FlowRF) and to ETFs (FlowETF). 
Flows are measured using the methodology of Sirri and Tufano (1998) and are calculated 
as: )1( ,1,,, titititi RTNATNAFlow +∗−= − , where TNAi,t is fund i’s total net assets at time t, 
and Ri,t is the fund’s return over the prior month. Flowi,t reflects the dollar growth of a 
fund in excess of the growth that would have occurred with no fund flows and all 
dividends reinvested. 
 Explanatory and control variables include: lagged flows to ETFs and regular 
funds; lagged index return; current and lagged return in regular funds and ETFs, 
calculated as the value-weighted average across funds tracking the same index; expense 
ratio; and the log of TNA, also calculated as the value-weighted average across funds 
tracking the same index. Return, lagged return, expense ratio, and the log of TNA on the 
right hand side of the equations are of those funds whose flows are on the left hand side 
of the model. Flow to industry is measured as the sum of flows to equity, bond, and 
hybrid mutual funds net of flows to index funds.  
 If both of the β1 coefficients are positive, then I cannot reject the hypothesis that 
conventional index funds and ETFs are complements. However, if either of the β1 
coefficients is negative, then I can reject the hypothesis and conclude that conventional 
index funds and ETFs are substitutes.  
The rest of the variables are for control purposes, with the following expected 
contributions. Flows to the mutual fund industry indicate investor sentiment and level of 
industry investment, and β4 is expected to be positive. Lagged index return measures the 
attractiveness of index products. Current and lagged returns of a fund are performance 
measures used in equity funds flow studies (Sirri and Tufano (1998)). Expenses measure 
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investors’ costs and are expected to have a negative relation to the flows. Total net assets 
are used to control for a size effect. 
To test the substitution effect hypothesis, I use regular OLS. However, to control 
for the endogeneity problem, where flows to regular funds and ETFs enter both equations 
as dependent and explanatory variables and may be endogenously determined, I use the 
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) approach. For both OLS and SUR, I control for 
fixed effects by including year and index dummy variables.  
Table 4 presents the results of the tests for substitution effect. Coefficients β1 on 
flows to regular funds and ETFs in both equations are negative and statistically 
significant at less than the 1-percent level with all test specifications, i.e. OLS and SUR 
with fixed year and index effects. Therefore, I can reject the null hypothesis that 
conventional funds and ETFs are complements and conclude that they are substitutes in 
attracting investors’ flows. Also, results show that fund flows are positively related to 
lagged flows for both conventional index funds and ETFs under the SUR fixed year 
effects specification. This result also holds for conventional index funds with the other 
model specifications. Flows to conventional index funds are also positively related to the 
industry flows. Flows to ETFs are positively related to fund returns with the significance 
level at less than 5 percent. SUR with fixed year effects indicates that flows to ETFs are 
negatively and flows to conventional index funds are positively related to fund expenses, 
and both fund types are positively related to fund size. 
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5.3 Clientele effect 
5.3.1 Tax clientele 
To test the tax clientele hypothesis, I use a natural experiment of changes in tax 
law and in capital gains tax rates. Before 1997, any asset sold, regardless of the holding 
period, was taxed as ordinary income subject to a maximum rate of 28%. After May 6, 
1997, the maximum rate on long-term capital gains fell to 20%, while short-term capital 
gains distributions remained taxed at the ordinary income rate, which can be as high as 
39.6%. The tax law change decreased the tax on long-term capital gains and made them 
more attractive, while the opposite happened for short-term capital gains. Mangers of 
mutual funds have the ability to adjust trades in a way to realize long-term gains instead 
of short-term capital gains. Plancich (2003) shows that managers appear to have tilted 
their distributions toward the long-term after 1997. Even if managers of index funds may 
not have as much flexibility when it comes to adjusting their portfolios, they still can to 
some extent. Therefore, I can use this tax change event to test the hypothesis of the tax 
clientele effect. I expect that, after the tax changes of 1997, the substitution effect 
between conventional index funds and ETFs should increase, as managers can make 
conventional index funds more attractive after tax by managing capital gains 
distributions. My data sample is limited to 2000-2004, and this change in tax law falls 
outside of the period of study. However, another favorable change in the tax rates on 
long-term capital gains happened in May 2003: The maximum tax rate was reduced from 
20% to 15%, while the tax rate on short-term capital gains remained unchanged. I use the 
following model to test for a tax clientele effect around this specific event with a system 
of equations.  
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i,ti,t10i,t9i,t8i,t7i,t6i,t5
i,t4i,t3i,t2i,t1i,ti,t
εLogTNAβExpensesβlagRetβRetβtlagIndexReβryFlowIndustβ
lagFlowETFβlagFlowRFβETFAfter*FlowβFlowETFβαFlowRF
++++++
+++++=      (2) 
i,ti,t10i,t9i,t8i,t7i,t6i,t5
i,t4i,t3i,t2i,t1i,ti,t
εLogTNAβExpensesβlagRetβRetβtlagIndexReβryFlowIndustβ
lagFlowETFβlagFlowRFβRFAfter*FlowβFlowRFβαFlowETF
++++++
+++++=  
where After = 1 for a period after May 2003 and is equal to zero otherwise, and 
After*Flow is an interaction term that captures the marginal effect of tax changes on 
flows to the funds. I expect β2 in both equations to be negative, indicating that the tax 
change and the resulting lower tax advantage of ETFs create more of a substitution effect 
between conventional index funds and ETFs. The β1 coefficient is still expected to be 
negative, showing a substitution effect between the fund types. The rest of the variables 
are defined as in earlier tests. 
Another way to test for differences in the tax clientele between conventional 
index funds and ETFs due to tax efficiency is to include continuous variables for tax rates 
or capital gains distributions in the model. I expect the coefficients on these variables to 
be negative, as increases in taxes or capital gains distributions make conventional index 
funds less attractive to non-tax exempt investors relative to ETFs. The following model 
with a system of equations is used to test this hypothesis. 
i,ti,t9i,t8i,t7i,t6i,t5
i,t4i,t3i,t2i,t1i,ti,t
εLogTNAβlagRetβRetβtlagIndexReβryFlowIndustβ
lagFlowETFβFCapGainsETβCapGainsRFβFlowETFβαFlowRF
+++++
+++++=       (3) 
i,ti,t9i,t8i,t7i,t6i,t5
i,t4i,t3i,t2i,t1i,ti,t
εLogTNAβlagRetβRetβtlagIndexReβryFlowIndustβ
lagFlowETFβFCapGainsETβCapGainRFβFlowRFβαFlowETF
+++++
+++++=  
where CapGainsRFi,t and CapGainsETFi,t are value-weighted capital gains distributions 
to regular funds and ETFs by index, respectively. The rest of the variables are as defined 
in earlier tests. 
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 Table 5 presents the results of the tests for tax clientele between regular funds and 
ETFs. Panel A reports the results of the event study around the capital gains tax change. 
As expected, coefficient β2 is negative and statistically significant at less than the 1-
percent level in both equations.  This indicates that as the tax advantages of ETFs over 
conventional index funds diminish, the two become better substitutes. The rest of the 
variables show similar results, as in the previous model of the substitution effect.  
 Panel B shows that the capital gains distributions of regular funds have negative 
effect on their flows, as was expected.  
 
5.3.2 Institutional clientele 
The hypothesis regarding the institutional clientele effect between retail and 
institutional investors and the intensified substitution effect between institutional index 
funds and ETFs is tested using the same initial model for the substitution effect, but 
separates the flows of regular funds into subsamples of institutional and retail funds. If 
ETFs are more suitable for institutional investors than for retail investors, then the β1 
coefficients are expected to be larger for the institutional subsample than for the retail 
group. I perform an F-test to determine whether coefficients in the two subsample 
regressions are statistically different from each other.  
Since I use the SUR approach, there are some limitations on the inclusion of all 
variables in one equation in order to make a meaningful comparison of coefficients 
across regressions. However, I run fixed effects OLS on a model that includes flows to 
ETFs as a dependent variable, and both flows to institutional and retail conventional 
funds as explanatory variables. The model is as follows: 
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     (4) 
If there is a clientele effect between institutional and retail conventional funds, 
and if the former are better substitutes for ETFs, then, from this model, I expect both 
coefficients β1 and β2 to be negative, but β1 to be larger in absolute value. 
 Table 6 presents the results of the tests for institutional clientele. Panel A reports 
the findings of the initial model (1) for a substitution effect on two separate subsamples. 
The coefficient of flows to ETFs with the dependent variable of flows to institutional 
funds is -0.108 and the coefficient of flows to ETFs with the dependent variable of flows 
to retail funds is -0.090, which are statistically significant at less than the 1-percent level. 
It could be suggested that institutional funds may be better substitutes for ETFs. 
However, the result of the F-test shows that only the coefficients of lagged flows to 
regular funds are statistically different from each other across subsample regressions.  
 Panel B presents the results from fixed effects OLS, where both flows to 
institutional and retail funds are included in one regression as explanatory variables. It 
shows that flows to both types of conventional funds have negative relations with flows 
to ETFs; however, the magnitude of this relationship is larger for retail funds, though the 
economic difference is not large. 
 
5.4 Summary of results 
 The results of this study demonstrate that conventional index funds and ETFs are 
substitutes. If ETFs are better performers, then one dollar of ETFs’ flows will take about 
22 cents of flows from regular funds. If conventional funds are better performers, then 
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one dollar of regular funds’ flows will take about 1.3 dollar of ETFs’ flows. Competition 
between the fund types mainly comes through fund expenses and the tracking error. 
Univariate analysis shows that ETFs’ expense ratios and tracking errors are generally 
lower than those of conventional funds. Therefore, as better performers, ETFs are gaining 
a share of the market at the expense of regular funds, as Fig. 2 presents.  
 However, if ETFs and conventional funds were perfect substitutes while ETFs 
suited investor preferences better, then we would not observe these two types of funds 
continuing to coexist. This paper shows that ETFs and regular funds are not perfect 
substitutes, and clientele effects exist between the two that separate them into different 
market niches. By using an event study approach, I find evidence of tax clientele, 
suggesting that ETFs are generally chosen over conventional index funds by tax sensitive 
investors. A test for institutional clientele did not reveal significant differences between 
institutional and retail investors’ reactions to the availability of ETFs.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 This paper examines one type of financial product innovation and studies how this 
innovation influences investors’ choices. The introduction of exchange traded funds to 
the market has been a successful innovation, as reflected in the rapid growth of their 
market share and their popularity in the investment industry. I study how existing 
products, conventional open-end index mutual funds specifically, share the market and 
compete with ETFs. Similar to innovations in other investment products, such as 
contracts in the futures market, the introduction of ETFs has increased competition in the 
index fund market. This has benefited investors. I analyze whether conventional index 
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funds and ETFs are substitutes and whether different features of these funds create 
clientele effects, extending competition beyond prices.  
 The study illustrates that conventional index funds and ETFs are substitutes. 
However, introduction of the new product, the ETF, did not replace the existing product, 
the conventional index fund. Rather, it created a new contract that added to the 
completeness of the market by offering new features previously unavailable in the regular 
funds. I find that conventional funds and ETFs are close, but are not perfect substitutes, 
as they may be preferred by different clienteles due to differences in the characteristics of 
the two fund types. This innovation is useful to both investors and the market, as it 
creates healthy competition in prices as well as service and product features.  
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Appendix 
 
Index Conventional Funds ETFs 
 Retail Institute  
Barra Large Cap Growth 3 2 1 
Barra Large Cap Value 1 3 1 
Barra Small Cap Growth 1 1 1 
Dow Jones Industrial 4 0 1 
Russell 2000 8 4 1 
Standard & Poors Midcap 400 6 4 2 
Standard & Poors Smallcap 600 5 2 1 
Wilshire 5000 10 6 1 
Standard & Poors 500 75 36 2 
All indexes 113 58 11 
 
 
 87
References: 
Blouin, J., J. S. Raedy, and D. A. Shackelford. “The Impact of Capital Gains Taxes on 
Stock Price Reactions to S&P 500 Inclusion.” NBER working paper 8011(2000) 
Blume, M., and R. Edelen. “S&P 500 Indexers, Delegation Costs, and Liquidity 
Mechanism.” Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Paper No. 
04-03 (2003). 
Blume, M., and R. Edelen. “S&P 500 Indexers, Tracking Error, and Liquidity: a Complex 
Answer to Profiting.” Journal of Portfolio Management, vol 30 issue 3 (Spring) 
(2004), 37-46 
Dickson, J., and J. Shoven. “A Stock Index Mutual Fund without Net Capital Gains 
Realizations.” NBER Working Paper 4717 (1994) 
Duffie, D., and M. Jackson. “Optimal Innovation of Futures Contracts.” The Review of 
Financial Studies, Vol 2(3) (1989), 275-296 
Elton, E., M. Gruber, G. Comer, and K. Li. “Spiders: Where are the Bugs?” Journal of 
Business, vol. 75, no. 3 (2002), 453-473 
Frame, W., and L. White. “Empirical Studies of Financial Innovation: Lots of Talk, Little 
Action?” Journal of Economic Literature, Volume 42, Number 1, March (2004), pp. 
116-144(29) 
Gastineau, G. “Exchange-Traded Funds: an Introduction.” Journal of Portfolio 
Management, Vol. 27 Issue 3 (Spring) (2001), 88 
Gastineau, G. “Equity Index Funds have Lost Their Way.” Journal of Portfolio 
Management, Vol 28 Issue 2 (Winter) (2002), 55 
 88
Gastineau, G. “The Benchmark Index ETF Performance Problem. A Simple Solution.” 
Journal of Portfolio Management, (Winter) (2004) 96-103 
Investment Company Institute. Mutual Fund Fact Book. Washington, D.C.: Investment 
Company Institute (2001). 
Johnston E., and J. McConnell. “Requiem for a Market: an Analysis of the Rise and Fall 
of a Financial Futures Contract.” The Review of Financial Studies, Vol 2 (1) (1989), 
1-23 
Kostovetsky, L. “Index Mutual Funds and Exchange-Traded Funds.” Journal of Portfolio 
Management, Vol. 29 Issue 4 (Summer) (2003), 80-93 
“Low Fidelity.” Economist, Vol. 372 Number 8394, Sep 25 2004, 88-91  
Poterba, J., and J. Shoven. “Exchange Traded Funds: a New Investment Option for 
Taxable Investors.” American Economic Review, V 92 iss 2 (May) (2002), 422-27 
Plancich, S. “Mutual Fund Capital Gain Distributions and the Tax Reform Act of 1997.” 
National Tax Journal, Vol 56, No 1, part 2 (March) (2003), 271-296 
Silber, W. “Innovation, Competition, and New Contract Design in Futures Markets.” The 
Journal of Futures Markets, Vol 1 (2) (1981), 123-155 
Sirri, E., and P. Tufano. “Costly Search and Mutual Funds Flows.” Journal of Finance, 
43, issue 5 (October) (1998), 1589-1622 
 89
Figure 1  
Assets in Equity Mutual Funds and Exchange Traded Funds, 1993-2004  
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Figure 2  
Exchange Traded and Index Mutual Funds’ Market Share, end of year, % of total 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Sep 23rd 2004, New York. From The Economist print edition 
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Table 2.1. Assets in Equity Mutual Funds and Exchange Traded Funds, 1993-2004  
 
Source: Investment Company Institute website 
Assets are given in billions of dollars. 
 
 Equity Mutual Funds Exchange traded Funds Domestic Equity ETF 
Year Assets Number Assets Number Assets Number 
1993 740.67 1586 0.5 1 0.5 1
1994 852.76 1886 0.4 1 0.4 1
1995 1249.08 2139 1.1 2 1.1 2
1996 1726.01 2570 2.4 19 2.2 2
1997 2368.02 2951 6.7 19 6.2 2
1998 2978.23 3513 15.6 29 14.5 12
1999 4041.89 3952 33.9 30 31.9 13
2000 3961.92 4385 65.6 80 63.5 55
2001 3418.16 4716 83.0 102 80.0 68
2002 2663.01 4748 102.1 113 93.0 66
2003 3684.80 4601 151.0 119 132.3 72
2004 4381.50 4551 226.2 151 184.0 102
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Table 2.2. Univariate Analysis of Effectiveness and Tracking Error: Conventional versus Exchange Traded Index Funds 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of effectiveness and tracking error of monthly gross returns at the index level, measured in percentage.  Effectiveness 
is a difference between fund gross return and return on the tracked index. Tracking error (TE) is the absolute value of the effectiveness measure. Corresponding 
statistics, along with t-tests for the difference in means, are provided for the sample of 171 conventional and 11 exchange traded index funds tracking nine 
indexes. The full sample contains 9,692 fund-month observations for the 2000-2004 period. The symbols *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at less 
than the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A Conventional ETF µ1≠ µ2 
Index Mean µ≠ 0 Std. Dev. Mean µ≠ 0 Std. Dev. 
Mean 
Difference t stat  
Effectiveness: Gross TE=NetRet-indexRet+1/12Exp 
Barra Large Cap Growth 0.012  0.401 -0.001  0.020 0.013 0.52  
Barra Large Cap Value 0.012  0.374 0.000  0.013 0.012 0.46  
Barra SmallCap Growth 0.027  0.718 0.001  0.044 0.026 0.37  
Dow Jones Industrial 0.219  7.255 0.273  6.607 -0.054 -0.05  
Russell 2000 0.015 * 0.225 -0.003  0.032 0.019 1.85 * 
Standard & Poors Midcap 400 0.029 ** 0.252 0.004  0.104 0.025 1.57  
Standard & Poors Smallcap 600 0.024 * 0.267 0.004  0.021 0.021 1.55  
Wilshire 5000 0.160 *** 0.905 0.119 *** 0.178 0.041 0.97  
Standard & Poors 500 0.025 *** 0.648 0.001  0.029 0.024 2.71 *** 
All nine indexes 0.040 *** 1.101 0.035  1.999 0.005 0.06  
Gross TE=abs(NetRet-indexRet+1/12Exp) 
Barra Large Cap Growth 0.190 *** 0.353 0.012 *** 0.016 0.178 8.12 *** 
Barra Large Cap Value 0.186 *** 0.324 0.009 *** 0.009 0.176 7.97 *** 
Barra SmallCap Growth 0.376 *** 0.611 0.020 *** 0.039 0.356 6.04 *** 
Dow Jones Industrial 5.496 *** 4.719 4.989 *** 4.279 0.507 0.66  
Russell 2000 0.121 *** 0.191 0.017 *** 0.028 0.104 12.20 *** 
Standard & Poors Midcap 400 0.122 *** 0.223 0.034 *** 0.098 0.088 6.03 *** 
Standard & Poors Smallcap 600 0.131 *** 0.234 0.011 *** 0.018 0.120 10.25 *** 
Wilshire 5000 0.422 *** 0.817 0.180 *** 0.113 0.242 7.22 *** 
Standard & Poors 500 0.134 *** 0.634 0.015 *** 0.024 0.119 13.81 *** 
All nine indexes 0.251 *** 1.072 0.492 *** 1.937 -0.242 -2.81 *** 
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Table 2.2. Continued 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of effectiveness and tracking error of monthly net returns at the index level, measured in percentage.  Effectiveness is 
a difference between fund net return and return on the tracked index. Tracking error (TE) is the absolute value of the effectiveness measure. Corresponding 
statistics, along with t-tests for the difference in means, are provided for the sample of 171 conventional and 11 exchange traded index funds tracking nine 
indexes. The full sample contains 9,692 fund-month observations for the 2000-2004 period. The symbols *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at less 
than the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent levels, respectively. 
 
Panel B Conventional ETF µ1≠ µ2 
Index Mean µ≠ 0 Std. Dev. Mean µ≠ 0 Std. Dev. 
Mean 
Difference t stat  
Effectiveness: TE= (NetRet-IndexRet) 
Barra Large Cap Growth -0.058 ** 0.415 -0.016 *** 0.019 -0.043 -1.66 * 
Barra Large Cap Value -0.004  0.374 -0.015 *** 0.013 0.011 0.43  
Barra SmallCap Growth 0.016  0.696 -0.020 *** 0.044 0.035 0.54  
Dow Jones Industrial 0.019  7.251 0.258  6.607 -0.239 -0.20  
Russell 2000 -0.044 *** 0.235 -0.024 *** 0.062 -0.020 -1.62  
Standard & Poors Midcap 400 -0.011  0.260 -0.015  0.101 0.004 0.25  
Standard & Poors Smallcap 600 -0.051 *** 0.219 -0.013 *** 0.023 -0.038 -3.43 *** 
Wilshire 5000 0.128 *** 0.903 0.106 *** 0.189 0.022 0.52  
Standard & Poors 500 -0.023 *** 0.659 -0.008 *** 0.028 -0.015 -1.69 * 
All nine indexes -0.010  1.102 0.018  1.910 -0.028 -0.34  
TE =abs(netRet-indexRet) 
Barra Large Cap Growth 0.235 *** 0.346 0.018 *** 0.017 0.217 10.12 *** 
Barra Large Cap Value 0.186 *** 0.324 0.017 *** 0.009 0.169 7.66 *** 
Barra SmallCap Growth 0.357 *** 0.597 0.029 *** 0.038 0.327 5.85 *** 
Dow Jones Industrial 5.521 *** 4.678 4.989 *** 4.278 0.531 0.70  
Russell 2000 0.142 *** 0.193 0.036 *** 0.056 0.106 9.94 *** 
Standard & Poors Midcap 400 0.137 *** 0.220 0.044 *** 0.092 0.093 6.75 *** 
Standard & Poors Smallcap 600 0.132 *** 0.182 0.018 *** 0.018 0.114 12.39 *** 
Wilshire 5000 0.403 *** 0.818 0.177 *** 0.122 0.225 6.74 *** 
Standard & Poors 500 0.158 *** 0.640 0.017 *** 0.023 0.141 16.43 *** 
All nine indexes 0.268 *** 1.069 0.460 *** 1.854 -0.191 -2.43 ** 
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Table 2.2. Continued 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of effectiveness and tracking error of monthly net returns at the index level measured in percentage.  Effectiveness is 
a difference between fund average net return across funds grouped by tracked index and return on the tracked index. Tracking error (TE) is an absolute value of 
the effectiveness measure. Corresponding statistics along with t-tests for the difference in means are provided for the sample of 171 conventional and 11 
exchange traded index funds tracking nine indexes. The full sample contains 9,692 fund-month observations for the 2000-2004 period. The symbols *, ** and 
*** indicate statistical significance at less than 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent levels, respectively. 
 
Panel C Conventional ETF µ1≠ µ2 
Index Mean µ≠ 0 Std. Dev. Mean µ≠ 0 Std. Dev. 
Mean 
Difference t stat  
Effectiveness: TE=(AveNetRet-IndexRet) 
Barra Large Cap Growth -0.052  0.295 -0.016 *** 0.019 -0.037 -0.96  
Barra Large Cap Value -0.003  0.306 -0.015 *** 0.013 0.012 0.30  
Barra SmallCap Growth 0.019  0.687 -0.020 *** 0.044 0.038 0.43  
Dow Jones Industrial 0.000  6.851 0.258  6.607 -0.258 -0.2  
Russell 2000 -0.043 *** 0.105 -0.024 *** 0.062 -0.019 -1.21  
Standard & Poors Midcap 400 -0.007  0.128 -0.016  0.071 0.009 0.47  
Standard & Poors Smallcap 600 -0.051 *** 0.129 -0.013 *** 0.023 -0.038 -2.25 ** 
Wilshire 5000 0.133 *** 0.389 0.106 *** 0.189 0.027 0.47  
Standard & Poors 500 -0.022 * 0.098 -0.007 *** 0.021 -0.015 -1.16  
All nine indexes -0.003  2.288 0.024  2.097 -0.027 -0.19  
TE=abs(AveNetRet-IndexRet) 
Barra Large Cap Growth 0.182 *** 0.237 0.018 *** 0.017 0.164 5.33 *** 
Barra Large Cap Value 0.157 *** 0.262 0.017 *** 0.009 0.139 4.11 *** 
Barra SmallCap Growth 0.351 *** 0.589 0.029 *** 0.038 0.321 4.22 *** 
Dow Jones Industrial 5.245 *** 4.354 4.989 *** 4.278 0.256 0.31  
Russell 2000 0.079 *** 0.080 0.036 *** 0.056 0.043 3.41 *** 
Standard & Poors Midcap 400 0.086 *** 0.094 0.043 *** 0.059 0.043 2.97 *** 
Standard & Poors Smallcap 600 0.091 *** 0.105 0.018 *** 0.018 0.073 5.28 *** 
Wilshire 5000 0.314 *** 0.262 0.177 *** 0.122 0.137 3.54 *** 
Standard & Poors 500 0.075 *** 0.067 0.015 *** 0.016 0.059 6.70 *** 
All nine indexes 0.731 *** 2.168 0.547 *** 2.024 0.184 1.39  
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Table 2.3. Descriptive statistics of ETFs and Conventional Index Funds Grouped by Index 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of ETFs and institutional and retail conventional open-end index funds grouped by tracked index during the 2000-
2004 period. For each variable, the mean is reported, and the standard deviation is given in parentheses. N is the number of fund-month observations, TNA is 
total net assets in millions of dollars, Exp is expense ratio (%), CapGain is capital gains distributions per share in dollars, and Flow is the net flow to a fund in 
millions of dollars. 
 
 ETF Institute Retail 
Index N TNA Exp CapGain Flow N TNA Exp CapGain Flow N TNA Exp CapGain Flow 
                
Barra Large Cap  56 738.2 0.18 0.016 35.0 108 853.3 0.13 0.000 14.6 156 3471.0 1.34 0.000 -17.87 
Growth  (601.8) (0.00) (0.040) (36.5)  (159.8) (0.03) (0.000) (39.0)  (4819.4) (0.99) (0.000) (95.62) 
Barra Large Cap  56 932.9 0.18 0.021 44.5 156 489.4 0.17 0.250 6.8 60 2978.4 0.22 0.391 -1.57 
Value  (773.1) (0.00) (0.052) (53.1)  (315.6) (0.06) (0.409) (31.5)  (477.1) (0.00) (0.483) (34.55) 
Barra SmallCap 48 379.7 0.25 0.000 16.5 56 69.0 0.11 0.204 0.5 60 567.5 0.27 0.114 16.04 
Growth  (277.2) (0.00) (0.000) (47.1)  (40.4) (0.01) (0.276) (15.4)  (348.3) (0.01) (0.230) (22.01) 
Dow Jones Industrial 48 4,861.6 0.18 0.000 92.4      144 108.3 2.40 0.101 -0.32 
  (1,848.0) (0.01) (0.000) (269.2)       (56.1) (3.69) (0.333) (3.67) 
Russell 2000 56 2,719.8 0.20 0.024 94.0 228 437.4 0.40 0.339 6.1 422 625.4 0.85 0.309 3.27 
  (1,945.0) (0.00) (0.058) (296.7)  (402.0) (0.34) (0.825) (24.8)  (1,419.3) (0.49) (0.764) (23.55) 
S&P Midcap 400 104 3,008.5 0.23 0.023 39.7 182 545.4 0.32 0.399 14.5 266 794.5 0.55 0.480 16.38 
  (2465.8) (0.03) (0.080) (246.9)  (359.7) (0.20) (0.591) (24.1)  (1,131.4) (0.33) (0.881) (31.65) 
S&P Smallcap 600 56 1,209.6 0.20 0.160 61.1 120 22.3 1.43 0.165 -0.04 300 307.1 0.69 0.391 2.68 
  (960.6) (0.00) (0.397) (155.1)  (15.8) (2.89) (0.286) (2.9)  (253.6) (0.53) (0.566) (7.22) 
Wilshire 5000 44 1,842.4 0.15 0.000 82.2 308 2,358.9 0.15 0.007 47.53 564 2,719.8 0.52 0.047 27.84 
  (1,074.4) (0.00) (0.000) (120.3)  (2,705.2) (0.08) (0.028) (111.7)  (6,028.7) (0.41) (0.134) (118.58)
S&P 500 104 19,284.8 0.10 0.005 346.7 2,035 2,609.3 0.31 0.232 15.3 3,955 1,778.1 0.72 0.230 -1.26 
  (16,557.0) (0.01) (0.019) (1,577.9)  (5,667.0) (0.21) (1.220) (132.3)  (9,643.0) (0.49) (1.102) (181.64)
                
All indexes 572 5,183.2 0.18 0.027 108.8 3,193 2,006.3 0.33 0.218 16.4 5,927 1,672.6 0.75 0.229 2.56 
  (9,859.4) (0.05) (0.138) (702.1)  (4,698.8) (0.64) (1.019) (112.5)  (8,177.7) (0.81) (0.959) (154.30)
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Table 2.4. Substitution Effect: Exchange Traded and Conventional Index Funds – Aggregate Flows 
 
This table presents results from estimating the pooled OLS and SUR regressions of substitution effect between exchange 
traded and conventional index funds. The sample includes U.S. open-end index mutual funds and ETFs that track the same 
indexes over the 2000-2004 period. Tests were performed with aggregate figures for the sample of 418 index-months. The 
estimated coefficients are from the regression specification of the following equations: 
i,ti,t9i,t8i,t7i,t6
i,t5i,t4i,t3i,t2i,t1i,ti,t
εLogTNAβExpensesβlagRetβRetβ
tlagIndexReβryFlowIndustβlagFlowETFβlagFlowRFβFlowETFβαFlowRF
++++
++++++=
 
i,ti,t9i,t8i,t7i,t6
i,t5i,t4i,t3i,t2i,t1i,ti,t
εLogTNAβExpensesβlagRetβRetβ
tlagIndexReβryFlowIndustβlagFlowETFβlagFlowRFβFlowRFβαFlowETF
++++
++++++=
 
where dependent variables are aggregated monthly flows to conventional index funds and to ETFs grouped by the index that 
the funds track. The independent variables include: lagged aggregate flows to both types of funds, industry flow, lagged 
index return, value weighted current and lagged funds returns, expenses, and log of aggregated by index TNA of 
conventional funds and ETFs. The regressions include index and year dummies. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The 
symbols *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at less than the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent levels, 
respectively. SUR reports system weighted R square. 
 FlowRF  FlowETF  
 OLS   SUR  SUR  OLS  SUR  SUR  
             
Intercept -182.50  -224.04  -804.72 *** 700.30  672.15  142.40  
 (-0.37)  (-0.47)  (-6.27)  (0.33)  (0.33)  (0.38)  
FlowETF -0.117 *** -0.215 *** -0.194 ***       
 (-6.03)  (-11.56)  (-9.93)        
FlowRF       -0.712 *** -1.317 *** -1.063 *** 
       (-5.98)  (-11.51)  (-9.68)  
lagFlowRF 0.202 *** 0.185 *** 0.316 *** -0.009  0.126  0.293 *** 
 (4.43)  (4.05)  (7.15)  (-0.07)  (1.09)  (2.67)  
lagFlowETF 0.003  0.014  0.037 * 0.095 * 0.090 * 0.145 *** 
 (0.16)  (0.67)  (1.78)  (1.89)  (1.79)  (2.91)  
FlowIndustry 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 ** -0.002  0.001  -0.001  
 (3.25)  (2.77)  (2.51)  (-0.64)  (0.25)  (-0.32)  
lagIndexRet -73.784  -167.795  -241.220  -900.967  -893.598  -953.05  
 (-0.10)  (-0.23)  (-0.32)  (-0.49)  (-0.49)  (-0.51)  
Ret 202.028  444.642  342.821  2,223.09 ** 2,200.19 ** 2,253.37 ** 
 (0.51)  (1.11)  (0.83)  (2.22)  (2.20)  (2.28)  
lagRet 196.021  277.043  174.329  734.353  834.165  696.29  
 (0.27)  (0.38)  (0.23)  (0.40)  (0.45)  (0.38)  
Expenses 19,779.9  16,786.6  27,973.9 *** -981,636  -888,591  -359,689 *** 
 (0.57)  (0.51)  (2.86)  (-0.86)  (-0.80)  (-3.18)  
logTNA -1.450  13.478  92.172 *** 148.295  126.053  111.563 *** 
 (-0.02)  (0.17)  (7.55)  (1.23)  (1.09)  (3.57)  
             
N of obs 418  418  418  418  418  418  
R-2 0.45  0.47  0.39  0.19  0.47  0.39  
Adj R-2 0.42      0.15      
Year 
Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Index 
Dummies Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  
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Table 2.5. Tax Clientele 
 
This table presents results from estimating pooled OLS and SUR regressions of tax clientele between ETFs and 
conventional index funds. The sample includes U.S. open-end index mutual funds and ETFs that track the same indexes 
over the 2000-2004 period. Tests are performed with aggregate figures for the sample of 418 index-months. The estimated 
coefficients are from regression specification of the following equations: 
i,ti,t10i,t9i,t8i,t7i,t6
i,t5i,t4i,t3i,t2i,t1i,ti,t
εLogTNAβExpensesβlagRetβRetβtlagIndexReβ
ryFlowIndustβlagFlowETFβlagFlowRFβETFAfter*FlowβFlowETFβαFlowRF
+++++
++++++=
 
i,ti,t10i,t9i,t8i,t7i,t6
i,t5i,t4i,t3i,t2i,t1i,ti,t
εLogTNAβExpensesβlagRetβRetβtlagIndexReβ
ryFlowIndustβlagFlowETFβlagFlowRFβRFAfter*FlowβFlowRFβαFlowETF
+++++
++++++=
 
where dependent variables are aggregated monthly flows to regular funds and to ETFs, grouped by the index that the funds 
track. The independent variables include: the interaction term of flows with dummy variable (After) indicating the change 
in capital gains taxes, lagged aggregate flows to both types of funds, flow to industry, lagged index return, value-weighted 
current and lagged funds returns, expenses, and log of aggregated by index TNA of regular funds and ETFs. The 
regressions include index and year dummies. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** indicate 
statistical significance at less than the 10, 5, and 1-percent levels, respectively. SUR reports system weighted R square. 
Panel A FlowRF  FlowETF  
 OLS   SUR  SUR  OLS  SUR  SUR  
             
Intercept -160.3  -154.9  -745.6 *** 765.7  786.9  173.3  
 (-0.33)  (-0.33)  (-5.94)  (0.37)  (0.40)  (0.47)  
FlowETF -0.026  -0.127 *** -0.096 ***       
 (-0.96)  (-4.88)  (-3.57)        
After*FlowETF -0.174 *** -0.146 *** -0.167 ***       
 (-4.74)  (-4.11)  (-4.50)        
FlowRF       -0.269 * -0.874 *** -0.617 *** 
       (-1.83)  (-6.16)  (-4.36)  
After*FlowRF       -0.878 *** -0.731 *** -0.732 *** 
       (-4.88)  (-4.20)  (-4.15)  
lagFlowRF 0.214 *** 0.197 *** 0.324 *** -0.030  0.092  0.260 ** 
 (4.81)  (4.43)  (7.53)  (-0.27)  (0.81)  (2.42)  
lagFlowETF -0.004  0.007  0.027  0.097 ** 0.092 * 0.145 *** 
 (-0.18)  (0.34)  (1.32)  (1.97)  (1.87)  (2.98)  
FlowIndustry 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** -0.002  0.0004  -0.001  
 (3.40)  (2.96)  (2.68)  (-0.68)  (0.13)  (-0.39)  
lagIndexRet -112.1  -189.7  -272.2  -644.5  -681.1  -739.0  
 (-0.16)  (-0.27)  (-0.37)  (-0.36)  (-0.38)  (-0.41)  
Ret 158.9  383.3  287.3  1831.6 * 1862.1 * 1846.2 * 
 (0.41)  (0.98)  (0.71)  (1.87)  (1.91)  (1.91)  
lagRet 257.7  323.9  242.5  656.0  743.3  548.9  
 (0.36)  (0.45)  (0.33)  (0.36)  (0.41)  (0.30)  
Expenses 18,439.7  15,044.9  24,491.7 *** -736,042  -770,809  -371,454 *** 
 (0.55)  (0.46)  (2.56)  (-0.66)  (-0.71)  (-3.35)  
logTNA -6.019  0.767  84.585 *** 77.762  79.860  105.916 *** 
 (-0.08)  (0.01)  (7.05)  (0.66)  (0.70)  (3.46)  
             
N of obs 418  418  418  418  418  418  
R-2 0.48  0.48  0.40  0.23  0.48  0.40  
Adj R-2 0.45      0.19      
Year Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Index Dummies Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  
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Table 2.5. Tax Clientele, Continued 
 
The estimated coefficients are from regression specification of the following equations: 
i,ti,t9i,t8i,t7i,t6
i,t5i,t4i,t3i,t2i,t1i,ti,t
εLogTNAβlagRetβRetβtlagIndexReβ
ryFlowIndustβlagFlowETFβFCapGainsETβCapGainsRFβFlowETFβαFlowRF
++++
++++++=
i,ti,t9i,t8i,t7i,t6
i,t5i,t4i,t3i,t2i,t1i,ti,t
εLogTNAβlagRetβRetβtlagIndexReβ
ryFlowIndustβlagFlowETFβFCapGainsETβCapGainRFβFlowRFβαFlowETF
++++
++++++=
 
where dependent variables are aggregated monthly flows to regular funds and to ETFs, grouped by index that the funds 
track. The independent variables include: capital gains, lagged aggregate flows to both types of funds, flow to industry, 
lagged index return, value weighted current and lagged funds returns, expenses, and log of aggregated by index TNA of 
regular funds and ETFs. The regressions include index and year dummies. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The 
symbols *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at less than the 10-percent levels, 5-percent levels, and 1-percent 
levels, respectively. SUR reports system weighted R square.  
 
Panel B FlowRF  FlowETF  
 OLS   SUR  SUR  OLS  SUR  SUR  
             
Intercept -124.3  -122.6  -714.8 *** -448.0  -424.5  -571.0 *** 
 (-0.17)  (-0.17)  (-4.65)  (-0.70)  (-0.67)  (-2.98)  
FlowETF -0.129 *** -0.250 *** -0.200 ***       
 (-3.44)  (-6.78)  (-5.35)        
FlowRF       -0.202 *** -0.396 *** -0.294 *** 
       (-3.41)  (-6.75)  (-5.17)  
CapGainsRF -16.32 *** -16.84 *** -11.90 *** -5.18  -8.31  0.39  
 (-4.51)  (-4.66)  (-3.56)  (-1.02)  (-1.63)  (0.10)  
CapGainsETF 93.84  88.93  54.27  142.58  152.75  131.11  
 (0.40)  (0.38)  (0.24)  (0.42)  (0.45)  (0.45)  
lagFlowRF 0.047  0.041  0.102 ** -0.039  -0.029  0.021  
 (1.00)  (0.87)  (2.19)  (-0.67)  (-0.49)  (0.37)  
lagFlowETF -0.003  0.012  0.034  0.118 *** 0.114 ** 0.149 *** 
 (-0.09)  (0.30)  (0.88)  (2.46)  (2.38)  (3.15)  
FlowIndustry 0.002  0.001  0.001  -0.005 * -0.005  -0.005  
 (0.68)  (0.38)  (0.20)  (-1.63)  (-1.48)  (-1.50)  
lagIndexRet 336.39  238.75  176.52  -743.63  -657.99  -688.32  
 (0.24)  (0.17)  (0.12)  (-0.41)  (-0.37)  (-0.38)  
Ret 540.69  807.91  752.70  2,121.5 ** 2,177.8 ** 1,919.4 ** 
 (0.76)  (1.14)  (1.05)  (2.35)  (2.41)  (2.17)  
lagRet 926.45  1,006.3  1,015.4  779.67  946.80  623.76  
 (0.66)  (0.71)  (0.71)  (0.43)  (0.52)  (0.34)  
logTNA 23.55  27.03  99.81 *** 80.57  76.93 * 114.63 *** 
 (0.17)  (0.20)  (5.70)  (0.97)  (0.94)  (4.23)  
             
N of obs 460  460  460  460  460  460  
R-2 0.18  0.21  0.16  0.13  0.21  0.16  
Adj R-2 0.14      0.09      
Year Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Index Dummies Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  
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Table 2.6. Institutional Clientele 
 
This table presents results from estimating seemingly unrelated regressions of the clientele effect between institutional 
and retail conventional index funds and ETFs. The sample includes U.S. open-end index mutual funds and ETFs that 
track the same indexes over the 2000-2004 period. Tests were performed with aggregate figures for the sample of 371 
institutional index-months and 418 retail index-months. The estimated coefficients are from the regression specification 
of the following equations: 
i,ti,t9i,t8i,t7i,t6
i,t5i,t4i,t3i,t2i,t1i,ti,t
εLogTNAβExpensesβlagRetβRetβ
tlagIndexReβryFlowIndustβlagFlowETFβlagFlowRFβFlowETFβαFlowRF
++++
++++++=
 
i,ti,t9i,t8i,t7i,t6
i,t5i,t4i,t3i,t2i,t1i,ti,t
εLogTNAβExpensesβlagRetβRetβ
tlagIndexReβryFlowIndustβlagFlowETFβlagFlowRFβFlowRFβαFlowETF
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where dependent variables are aggregated monthly flows to institutional and retail index mutual funds and to ETFs, 
grouped by tracked index. The independent variables include: lagged aggregate flows to the types of funds, flow to 
industry, lagged index return, value-weighted current and lagged funds returns, expenses, and log of aggregated by 
index TNA of institutional or retail funds and ETFs. The regressions include index and year dummies. T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at less than the 10-percent, 5-
percent, and 1-percent levels, respectively. SUR reports system weighted R square. The F-test reports significance of 
difference in coefficients between groups. 
 
Panel A FlowInst  FlowETF  FlowRetail  FlowETF  F test 
 SUR  SUR  SUR  SUR    
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1-3) (2-4) 
Intercept 61.801  2,663.73  122.571  -167.882    
 (0.20)  (1.23)  (0.41)  (-0.08)    
FlowETF -0.108 ***   -0.090 ***     
 (-7.37)    (-7.20)      
FlowRF   -1.354 ***   -1.354 ***   
   (-7.53)    (-7.13)    
lagFlowRF 0.089 * 0.522 *** 0.291 *** -0.351 * *** *** 
 (1.67)  (2.82)  (6.54)  (-1.92)    
lagFlowETF -0.003  0.123 ** 0.016  0.080    
 (-0.17)  (2.30)  (1.27)  (1.61)    
FlowIndustry 0.002  -0.004  0.003 *** -0.002    
 (1.42)  (-0.97)  (3.05)  (-0.58)    
lagIndexRet -497.062  4,384.86  -313.712  -1,027.64    
 (-0.16)  (0.07)  (-0.68)  (-0.56)    
Ret -95.601  1,777.66  511.594 ** 2,759.89 ***   
 (-0.30)  (1.59)  (2.02)  (2.75)    
lagRet 651.201  -4,542.76  202.952  1,228.33    
 (0.21)  (-0.07)  (0.44)  (0.66)    
Expenses 21.043  -2,262,182  3,396.0  -205,261.0    
 (0.00)  (-1.57)  (0.16)  (-0.18)    
logTNA 24.916  179.692  -37.202  71.666    
 (0.81)  (1.36)  (-0.77)  (0.60)    
           
N of obs 371  371  418  418    
R-2 0.36  0.36  0.38  0.38    
           
Year Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    
Index Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    
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Table 2.6. Institutional Clientele, Continued 
 
This table presents results from OLS regressions of clientele effect between institutional and retail 
conventional index funds and ETFs. The sample includes U.S. open-end index mutual funds and ETFs that 
track the same indexes over the 2000-2004 period. Tests are performed with aggregate figures for the 
sample of 371 ETF index-months. The estimated coefficients are from regression specification of the 
following equation: 
i,ti,t11i,t10
i,t9i,t8i,t7i,t6i,t5
i,t4i,t3i,t2i,t1i,ti,t
εLogTNAβExpensesβ
lagRetβRetβtlagIndexReβryFlowIndustβlagFlowETFβ
aillagFlowRetβtlagFlowInsβFlowRetailβFlowInstβαFlowETF
++
+++++
+++++=
 
where the dependent variable is aggregated monthly to ETFs, grouped by index that the funds track. The 
independent variables include: aggregate flows to retail and institutional index funds, lagged aggregate 
flows to funds, flow to industry, lagged index return, value weighted current and lagged ETFs’ return, 
expenses, and the log of aggregated by index TNA of ETFs. The regressions include index and year 
dummies. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at less than the 10-precent, 5-percent, and 1-percent levels, respectively.  
 
Panel B FlowETF  FlowETF  
     
Intercept 237.903  -48.334  
 (0.11)  (-0.12)  
FlowRetail -0.607 *** -0.527 *** 
 (-2.99)  (-2.72)  
FlowInst -0.576 *** -0.487 *** 
 (-3.23)  (-2.86)  
lagFlowRetail -0.662 *** -0.618 *** 
 (-3.43)  (-3.32)  
lagFlowInst -0.610 *** 0.712 *** 
 (3.38)  (4.16)  
lagFlowETF 0.098 * 0.113 ** 
 (1.87)  (2.21)  
IndustryFlow -0.003  -0.004  
 (-0.85)  (-1.12)  
lagIndexRet 14,468  -30,243  
 (0.24)  (-0.55)  
Ret 2,293.21 ** 2,291.91 ** 
 (2.13)  (2.19)  
lagRet -14,002  30,765  
 (-0.23)  (0.56)  
Expenses -133,700  -167,185  
 (-0.09)  (-1.34)  
logTNA 66.482  71.151 ** 
 (0.51)  (2.01)  
     
N of obs 371  371  
R-2 0.24  0.23  
Adj. R-2 0.19  0.20  
Year Dummies Yes  Yes  
Index Dummies Yes  No  
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